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60 
EVIDENCE-BASED FEDERAL CIVIL 
RULEMAKING: 
A NEW CONTEMPORANEOUS CASE 
CODING RULE 
 
Will Rhee* 
 
Introduction 
 
Consistent with democratic ideals, evidence-based 
policymaking (“EBP”) seeks to elevate facts over politics. 
Evidence-based federal civil rulemaking attempts to use 
objective factual evidence1 to evaluate the effectiveness of new 
or proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. As Maurice Rosenberg recognized, “To know the 
impact of a rule of civil procedure requires answering but two 
straightforward questions: Does the rule work? Does it achieve 
the intended results without unacceptable side effects?”2 This 
Article proposes a new Federal Rule (the “Model Rule”) 
concerning the federal courts’ online case 
management/electronic case filing system (“CM/ECF”). 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. I 
thank Jena Martin-Amerson, Megan Annitto, Kelly Behre, Tom Cady, Vince 
Cardi, Eric Chaffee, andré cummings, Jean Dailey, Atiba Ellis, Matt Green, 
Victor Quintanilla, Dale Olson, Bertha Romine, Mark Spottswood, and Elaine 
Wilson for their outstanding comments; Felix Kumah-Abiwu, Dominque 
Razzook, and Ron Virts for their excellent research assistance; and the Pace 
Law Review staff for their exemplary editing. In addition, this Article was 
presented at the June 14, 2012, Ohio Legal Scholarship Workshop and the 
January 17, 2013, West Virginia University College of Law Faculty 
Colloquium. Finally, I thank the Hodges Research Fund for funding. All 
errors are my sole responsibility. I welcome comments at 
william.rhee@mail.wvu.edu. 
1. For a definition of “evidence,” see infra notes 21-22 and accompanying 
text. 
2. Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-Impact Studies in the 
Administration of Justice, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Summer 1988, at 13, 
14. 
1
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Whenever a party, the court clerk, or the presiding judge in a 
civil lawsuit electronically files a document, the Model Rule 
requires her to answer standardized online questions about 
that document.3 These questions are limited to indisputable 
factual information about case-related outcomes.4 By 
answering these questions, the filer codes research variables5 
contemporaneously with the filing of every document. Such 
mandatory contemporaneous coding would provide 
comprehensive, reliable, and inexpensive descriptive empirical 
data6 for evidence-based rulemaking. This Federal Courts 
CM/ECF Descriptive Dataset (“FCCEDD”—pronounced “fuh-
said” for short) should be publicly available. 
For example, assume that a judge7 has finished writing her 
memorandum order ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 
She wants to enter the order on CM/ECF. The judge would log 
on to CM/ECF using her assigned log-in and password, select 
the “order” option from an online drop down menu,8 and then 
 
3. As explained further below, the Rule requires responses to a uniform 
national set of mandatory questions and encourages responses to any 
jurisdiction-specific voluntary questions that an individual court may choose 
to add. See infra Part IV. 
4. Case-related “outcomes” are facts idiosyncratic to the specific lawsuit 
about personal characteristics (e.g., judge’s name, party’s name, counsel’s 
name, location of party’s residence/headquarters), arguments (e.g., the stated 
legal basis for each of the three causes of action in the complaint—what a 
side is claiming regardless of the claim’s actual legal merit), and litigation 
results (e.g., the fact the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss in 
full). See generally Will Rhee, Entitled to Be Heard: Improving Evidence-
Based Policy Making Through Audience and Public Reason, 85 IND. L.J. 1315, 
1317-18 (2010). For further discussion, see infra Part IV. 
5. “Coding variables” is “the process of translating properties or 
attributes of the world (i.e., variables) into a form that researchers can 
systematically analyze after they have chosen the appropriate measures to 
tap the underlying variable of interest.” Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, 
Coding Variables, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 321 (Kimberly 
Kempf-Leonard ed. 2005) [hereinafter Epstein & Martin, Coding Variables]. 
6. Empirical data are the product of empirical research. For a definition 
of “empirical research,” see infra note 23. 
7. Although most of the examples in this Article concern the federal 
district court, the same principles apply to all federal courts. There is no 
reason why contemporaneous coding cannot be applied to specialized federal 
courts, the circuit courts, and the Supreme Court. 
8. A “drop down menu” is a “horizontal list of options that each contain a 
vertical menu. When you roll over or click one of the primary options in a 
drop down menu, a list of choices will ‘drop down’ below the main menu.” 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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select the defendant’s motion for summary judgment previously 
filed in the case to associate her order as a response to that 
motion. At this point, a dialog box9 would pop up in CM/ECF 
asking the judge a set of standardized research questions about 
the content of her order. To answer the questions, the judge 
would either select further options in additional drop down 
menus or enter the appropriate text in blank boxes. By 
answering these questions, the judge would code outcome 
variables about her order contemporaneously with her filing of 
that order. Only after the judge has finished answering all 
required questions would CM/ECF let her complete 
electronically filing the order. 
As most orders to be filed by a court are drafted by a party, 
the party’s attorney or pro se party has not only the best 
knowledge of the case but also a sanctionable duty of candor to 
the court under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.10 The coding of the electronic file is likely to be 
highly reliable under the watchful eyes of opposing counsel and 
the judge. Because the coding also is directly associated with 
the underlying source document, the court, opposing counsel, or 
a researcher can easily confirm the coding’s accuracy. Because 
the coding merely describes the underlying source document, it 
lacks legal precedential authority independent of its underlying 
 
Drop Down Menu, TECHTERMS.COM, 
http://www.techterms.com/definition/dropdownmenu (last visited Noc. 24, 
2012). 
9. A “dialog box” initiates a “dialog with the user. It is a window that 
pops up on the screen with options that the user can select. After the 
selections have been made, the user can typically click ‘OK’ to enter the 
changes or ‘Cancel’ to discard the selections.” Dialog Box, TECHTERMS.COM, 
http://www.techterms.com/definition/dialogbox (last visited Nov. 24, 2012). 
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Although lawyers might be loath to file for Rule 11 
sanctions against other lawyers, there is anecdotal evidence that the current 
version of Rule 11 “has caused litigators to undertake some disinterested 
evaluation and certification in their everyday practice.” Sung Hui Kim, 
Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REV. 73, 118 
n.279 (2010). A 2005 Federal Judicial Center survey of 278 federal district 
court judges concluded that eighty percent of surveyed judges agreed: “Rule 
11 is needed and is just right as it now stands.” DAVID RAUMA & THOMAS E. 
WILLGING, REPORT OF A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES’ 
EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 2 (2005). 
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source document.11 Furthermore, because the FCCEDD shall 
be open to the public online and be searchable by name, both 
the court and counsel will have personal incentives to ensure 
the coding’s accuracy and thereby protect their public 
reputation. 
While the current CM/ECF system is mandated in a 
decentralized fashion through local rules,12 only a new uniform 
Federal Rule can guarantee the centralized coding and 
collection necessary to create useful baseline data. Although 
adversaries can continue to disagree over the interpretation of 
this data, the required online coding of case outcomes 
simultaneous with the electronic filing of case documents 
should provide an objective, universally acceptable starting 
point for debate. Because all law seeks to influence aggregate 
human behavior,13 it must rely upon implicit or explicit 
empirical assumptions about how humans behave. To 
maximize law’s effectiveness, therefore, those empirical 
assumptions must be tested. If those underlying assumptions 
prove inaccurate, then the corresponding laws should be 
amended accordingly.14 
This Model Rule is ripe for consideration now. At present, 
the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts is poised to begin 
designing the “Next Generation of CM/ECF” to replace the 
current system.15 The federal courts already operate “the 
world’s most transparent court system.”16 Implementing this 
Model Rule in the next generation CM/ECF system would take 
transparency and evidence-based rulemaking to a higher level. 
 
11. In this limited respect, mandatory case coding is analogous to the 
Reporter of Decisions’s syllabus to a Supreme Court decision. See United 
States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906). For further 
discussion, see also infra Part IV.A.2. 
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
13. See Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 34 (2011). 
14. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
15. The Third Branch, Task Force Elicits User Views on “Next Gen” 
CM/ECF, U.S. CRTS. (Apr. 2012, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/12-04-
01/Task_Force_Elicits_User_Views_on_Next_Gen_CM_ECF.aspx. For further 
discussion, see infra notes 291-99 and accompanying text. 
16. Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 
484 (2009). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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This thesis is examined in four parts. Part I explains why 
evidence-based policymaking needs not only objective 
descriptive data to provide a universal baseline for policy 
evaluation but also a paradigm shift in the way evidence is 
viewed and used in policymaking. Part II reviews the history of 
empirical research of federal civil rulemaking from its humble 
beginning, through its acceptance and institutionalization, to 
today’s so-called “New Legal Realist” or “Empirical Legal 
Studies” movement.17 Part III summarizes the CM/ECF 
revolution in the federal courts and explains how 
contemporaneous coding can code more federal cases at less 
cost than current methods. Finally, Part IV explains the 
proposed empirical coding Model Rule and provides sample 
coding outcomes. 
 
I. Evidence-Based Policymaking 
 
The words “evidence-based” in evidence-based federal civil 
rulemaking refer to the larger evidence-based policymaking 
(“EBP”) movement.18 EBP is “a policy process that helps 
planners make better-informed decisions by putting the best 
available evidence at the centre of the policy process.”19 To 
attempt to accomplish such a lofty goal, EBP employs 
evaluative research, “the primary objective of which is to 
determine the extent to which a given program or procedure is 
achieving some desired result. The ‘success’ of an evaluation 
 
17. For further discussion, see infra Part II.C. 
18. See, e.g., KAREN BOGENSCHNEIDER & THOMAS J. CORBETT, EVIDENCE-
BASED POLICYMAKING (2010); WHAT WORKS? EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY AND 
PRACTICE IN PUBLIC SERVICES (Huw T.O. Davies et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter 
WHAT WORKS?]; William Solesbury, Evidence Based Policy: Whence it Came 
and Where it’s Going (ESRC UK Ctr. for Evidence Based Pol’y & Practice, 
Working Paper No. 1, 2001), available at 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/politicaleconomy/research/cep/pubs/pa
pers/assets/wp1.pdf; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 901, 910 (2011); Rhee, supra note 4, at 1317. 
19. Marco Segone, Evidence-Based Policy Making and The Role of 
Monitoring and Evaluation within the New Aid Environment, in BRIDGING 
THE GAP: THE ROLE OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION IN EVIDENCE-BASED 
POLICY MAKING 16, 27 (Marco Segone ed. 2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/evidence_based_policy_making.pdf. 
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project will be largely dependent upon its usefulness to the 
administrator in improving services.”20 Of the two types of 
policymaking, intuitive and analytical,21 EBP is much more 
analytical. But even intuitive decision making needs to be 
informed by some evidence to avoid jumping to conclusions.22 
All policymaking thus relies upon evidence to some degree. 
Evidence implies verifiable facts, not unsupported theories or 
hunches. Although the most common source of such evidence is 
empirical research,23 the concept of evidence is broader than 
research.24 Implicit in EBP is the premise that the most 
 
20. Christina A. Christie & Marvin C. Alkin, An Evaluation Theory Tree, 
in EVALUATION ROOTS: TRACING THEORISTS’ VIEWS AND INFLUENCES 12, 22 
(Marvin C. Alkin ed. 2004) (citing EDWARD SUCHMAN, EVALUATIVE RESEARCH 
21 (1967)). 
21. PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, 
DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND 
POLICYMAKERS 21-25 (2010) (citations omitted). 
22. Id. at 23-24 (citations omitted). In the policymaking context, 
intuitive decision making is best for quick decisions made under time 
pressure with incomplete information. Id. at 22-23. Because the scope of this 
Article is limited to deliberative decision making where lawmakers can take 
their time to gather and analyze evidence, intuitive decision making does not 
apply here. If there is insufficient time to gather and analyze evidence, EBP 
is impossible. 
23. “Empirical research” is 
 
[I]nformation collected through systematic observation and 
experience (in contrast, for example, to information derived 
through theory or logic). . . . Generally, an empirical 
statement is one that can be proven wrong. Empirical 
research designs encompass experimental research, quasi-
experimental research, observational studies, and case 
studies. Research methods include surveys and focus 
groups. Empirical research can take place in the field, in a 
laboratory, or even in a library setting. Samples of subjects 
to be studied can be selected on a random basis or for the 
convenience of the researcher. Empirical research can be 
reported on a quantitative or qualitative basis. 
 
Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil 
Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1126 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
Whereas quantitative research is a “strategy that emphasizes quantification 
in the collection and analysis of data,” qualitative research is a “strategy that 
usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and 
analysis of data.” ALAN BRYMAN, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 380 (4th ed. 
2012). 
24. Solesbury, supra note 18, at 8. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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effective evidence, rather than merely any evidence, should 
guide policy. Three “R” questions can guide the selection of 
evidence for EBP: “[H]ow relevant is this to what we are 
seeking to understand or decide? [H]ow representative is this of 
the population that concerns us? [H]ow reliable, how well-
founded—theoretically, empirically—is it?”25 
Lawmakers would not champion—at least publicly—
“evidence-ignoring” policy. Nevertheless, there are many 
examples of policymakers appearing to ignore considerable 
contrary evidence because of ideology or self-interest.26 Just as 
people can have a sense of injustice without being able to 
precisely define justice,27 EBP may be easier to define in its 
absence. Indeed, some policies are more driven by evidence 
than others. 
EBP assumes that the best solution to a legal problem first 
requires an open-minded review of relevant objective factual 
evidence about the problem. Such evidence should then inform 
the formulation and selection of a possible policy solution.28 
Evidence should drive policy. EBP supports the idea that 
evidence is essential not only during initial policy development, 
but also throughout the entire policy cycle.29 Objective factual 
evidence can not only be used to assess a new policy’s impact 
on a problem, but also to provide lawmakers with feedback to 
inform subsequent policy revisions. Ideally, lawmakers would 
 
25. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis in original). 
26. For example, American federal policymakers continue to take little 
action over climate change despite the considerable scientific evidence that 
climate change is indeed occurring. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE ix (2010), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12782. 
27. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 4-5 (2009). 
28. See Martin Partington, Empirical Legal Research and Policy-
Making, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 1002, 1004 
(Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzer, eds. 2010). 
29. See, e.g., NORMAN BLAIKIE, DESIGNING SOCIAL RESEARCH: THE LOGIC 
OF ANTICIPATION 74 (2d ed. 2010) (citing CAROL H. WEISS, EVALUATION 
RESEARCH: METHODS FOR ASSESSING PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 4, 6 (1972)); 
Ruth Levitt et al., Evidence for Accountability: The Nature and Uses of 
Evidence in the Audit, Inspection and Scrutiny Functions of Government in 
the UK (ESRC UK Ctr. for Evidence Based Pol’y and Practice, Working Paper 
No. 24, 2006), available at 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/politicaleconomy/research/cep/pubs/pa
pers/paper-24.aspx. 
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test promising policy ideas through controlled, randomized 
experiments and use the resulting data to decide which policy 
idea to implement on a larger scale.30 
EBP cannot avoid politics because evaluation, “both as a 
process and in terms of research findings, affect[s] and [is] 
affected by the political context.”31 In light of the inherent 
politics of democracy, too often lawmakers do not choose policy 
based on evidence, but rather on “ideology, values, political 
interests, and other influences that are beyond the reach of the 
knowledge broker.”32 This political context has become 
unavoidable with the “massive rise” in the twentieth century of 
partisan “pressure groups of one sort or another, university 
researchers, independent ‘think-tanks[,’] professional bodies 
and statutory organizations[,]” which seek “explicitly to advise 
or influence government[]. . . .”33 
Once committed to a particular policy, lawmakers may 
pick and choose only evidence that agrees with their pet 
policy.34 Such opinion-based policy “relies heavily on either the 
selective use of evidence (e.g.[,] on single studies irrespective of 
 
30. See, e.g., BLAIKIE, supra note 29, at 36; BRYMAN, supra note 23, at 50-
51; JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 81 (7th ed. 2010); Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Quantitative 
Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 901, 903 (Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzer eds. 
2010) [hereinafter Epstein & Martin, Quantitative Approaches]; Michael 
Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 931 (2011). See 
generally ROBERT F. BORUCH, RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENTS FOR PLANNING AND 
EVALUATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (C. Deborah Laughton et al. eds., 1997). 
31. Christie & Alkin, supra note 20, at 29 (citing CAROL WEISS, 
EVALUATION RESEARCH IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 214 (1991)). 
32. BOGENSCHNEIDER & CORBETT, supra note 18, at 261 (citing Carol 
Weiss, Research-Policy Linkages: How Much Influence Does Social Science 
Research Have?, in UNESCO, WORLD SOCIAL SCIENCE REPORT 1999, at 194-
205). 
33. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice 
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 1. 
34. See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS 
THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 112-115 (2007); Charles Lord et al., Biased 
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on 
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 
2106 (1979); Robert MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of 
Research Results, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 259, 267 (1998); Monica Prasad et 
al., “There Must Be a Reason”: Osama, Saddam, and Inferred Justification, 
79 SOC. INQUIRY 142, 155 (2009). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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quality) or on the untested views of individuals or groups, often 
inspired by ideological standpoints, prejudices, or speculative 
conjecture.”35 Aware of this tendency, partisan pressure groups 
eagerly assemble and present partisan “evidence” of varying 
quality to supportive lawmakers so that these lawmakers can 
claim the persuasive power of evidence without ever having 
really used it in their decision making.36 In this instance, policy 
drives evidence. 
Claiming the persuasive power of evidence can be an 
effective political response to the rising skepticism of and 
cynicism about democratic government from “an increasingly 
educated, informed and questioning public” seeking 
reassurance that its taxes are being used effectively.37 To such 
a skeptical public, the ideal of EBP has a rhetorical appeal “as 
a means of ensuring that what is being done is worthwhile and 
that it is being done in the best possible way.”38 For example, in 
1997, a United Kingdom Labour government “was elected with 
the philosophy of ‘what matters is what works’—on the face of 
it signaling a conscious retreat from political ideology.”39 
Apparently, this political strategy did not “work” because the 
Labour Party was voted out of office in 2010 and became the 
opposition party.40 
The convergence of a number of contemporary conditions 
makes EBP appear more promising. In addition to an 
increasingly well-informed public seeking greater government 
accountability, the proliferation of cheap, easily accessible 
information technology—such as the internet—has contributed 
to the symbiotic expansion of the research community’s size 
and capabilities.41 
 
 
35. Segone, supra note 19, at 27. 
36. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice 
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 1. 
37. Id. at 1-2. 
38. Id. at 2. 
39. Id. at 1. 
40. See John F. Burns, British Labour Party Looks to Rebuild, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 16, 2010, at A4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/europe/17britain.html?_r=0. 
41. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice 
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 2. 
9
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Federal civil rulemaking paradoxically presents both 
promise and peril for EBP. The federal civil rules and its 
rulemaking process are promising for EBP. Contrary to the 
federal criminal rules, where the government’s obligation to 
prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt inhibits 
transparent information sharing,42 the federal civil rules, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, encourage such 
transparency.43 
Moreover, the custodian of the federal civil rules takes its 
job very seriously.44 Composed of appointed expert judges, 
lawyers, and law professors,45 the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee (the “Advisory Committee”) currently appears to 
value empirical research in its slow and cautious deliberations 
over any possible rules amendments. As then chair Mark R. 
Kravitz explained three years ago, the Advisory Committee is 
“committed to gathering empirical data about the operation of 
the rules and any proposed rule changes so that we better 
understand the likely effect of rule revisions. Gathering and 
analyzing empirical data takes time.”46 Also, three years ago, 
former chair, Judge Lee Rosenthal, reiterated that the 
Advisory Committee is “committed to getting more empirical 
information . . . and we know we have only started.”47 
 
42. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 & advisory committee’s notes 
(explaining discovery in federal criminal cases); Mary Prosser, Reforming 
Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 541, 549-53. 
43. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“Mutual knowledge 
of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper 
litigation.”). See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: 
The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. 
REV. 691 (1998). 
44. For example, a former Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, 
Judge Lee Rosenthal, commented that she thought “that a glass of red wine 
and the pocket part of Moores or Wright & Miller is a great Saturday night” 
and that discussing changes to the rules “is the most interesting question in 
the world, right up there with the meaning of life.” Alexander Dimitrief et al., 
Update on the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 211, 
211 (2010) (statement of Judge Rosenthal). 
45. See Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not to Revise: That is the 
Question, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 213, 216-17 (2010). 
46. Id. at 217 (footnote omitted). 
47. Dimitrief et al., supra note 44, at 242 (statement of Judge 
Rosenthal). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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Demonstrating that perhaps the lesson had sunk in, the former 
chair later interjected, “[s]ounds like we need some more of 
that empirical research to answer that question.”48 
Furthermore, the Federal Judicial Center, the 
congressionally created judicial think-tank,49 can provide the 
Advisory Committee with professional empirical research upon 
request.50 This expert Committee has a tradition of 
recommending the “best rules rather than rules that might be 
supported most widely or might appease special interests.”51 
The Advisory Committee’s empirically informed annual rules 
amendments crafted “with exacting and meticulous care”52 are 
insulated from, and yet are still accountable to, popular 
democracy. Although these amendments become law by 
default, Congress retains the power to reject them.53 
In contrast, the federal civil litigation’s adversarial 
system54 and high cost55 are perilous for EBP. Law unavoidably 
 
48. Id. at 245. 
49. See infra Part II.B.2 for further discussion. 
50. Russell Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial 
Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 31, 39-40 (1988). The FJC has declined Committee research requests 
only a few times, apparently with mutual consent. William W. Schwarzer, 
Tribute, The Federal Judicial Center and the Administration of Justice in the 
Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1129, 1141 & n.46 (1995) (citing Report 
of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Relationship between the Federal 
Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 7 
(Sept. 24, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center)). 
51. Daniel R. Coquillette, A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: 
A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee 
on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 685 (1995) (Report prepared by Thomas E. 
Baker and Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook). 
52. Judge Thomas F. Hogan, The Federal Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, U.S. CRTS. (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingP
rocess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx. 
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006). 
54. Stephan Landsman, Introduction to the Adversary System, in 
READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO 
ADJUDICATION 1 (Stephen Landsman ed. 1988). 
55. See, e.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL 
REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS 
TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/Conte
11
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relies upon politics and competing normative assumptions.56 
The zero-sum character of litigation means there is almost 
always a loser and a winner. Furthermore, the rules—although 
seemingly neutral on their face—incorporate policy tradeoffs 
that unavoidably favor or burden one adversary more than the 
other.57 While the Advisory Committee can attempt to calibrate 
the commensurate level of favoritism or burden at each stage of 
litigation, the ultimate tradeoffs contained in the rules are the 
inevitable by-product of the adversarial system.58 
Thus, in public debate over the rules, not surprisingly self-
interest reigns: defense-friendly interests seek defense-friendly 
rules, and plaintiff-friendly interests seek plaintiff-friendly 
rules.59 And if their adversary brandishes empirical research 
against them, then that research must either be obvious or 
wrong.60 In the context of adversarial litigation, often the only 
acceptable empirical research is that which agrees with one’s 
position.61 Viewing evidence through a biased, self-interested 
lens is integral to the adversarial system.62 
 
ntDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008. 
56. See Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 917-18. “Norms” are “[s]tandards 
for how one ought to act. . . . In the terms of practical reasoning, norms are 
standards that give reasons for action.” BRIAN H. BIX, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL 
THEORY 149 (2004). The word “normative” implies “[w]hat ought to be done. 
The normative aspect of a discussion or a set of facts is its implications for 
how people should act, how rules should be changed, or even how theories 
should be constructed.” Id. at 148. Normative questions are “‘should’ 
questions, questions about how individuals or institutions should behave.” 
Aaron Rappaport, The Logic of Legal Theory: Reflections on the Purpose and 
Methodology of Jurisprudence, 73 MISS. L.J. 559, 572 (2004). 
57. See Alan Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly 
Functioning Civil Procedure System, 90 OR. L. REV. 993, 995 (2012). 
58. Id. at 995-997. 
59. See Arthur Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play 
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 16 (2010) (discussing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 8). 
60. Pioneering empiricist and Advisory Committee member Maurice 
Rosenberg said that there are “two kinds of empirical data bearing on courts:” 
(1) “the kind that lawyers and judges dismiss as a demonstration of the 
obvious; of course, they say, we already knew that” and (2) “data that lawyers 
and judges dismiss as counterintuitive; nuts, they say, that cannot be so.” 
Paul Carrington, Maurice Rosenberg, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1901, 1903 (1995); 
see also Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 29. 
61. See supra note 34. 
62. See Christopher P. Guzelian & John F. Pfaff, Evidence Based Policy 
1, 21-22 (Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 976,376, 2007), 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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Karen Bogenschneider and Thomas Corbett, two leading 
researchers at the Institute of Research on Poverty at the 
University of Wisconsin—Madison (“IRP”),63 have confirmed 
that such bias is not limited to litigation. Combined, 
Bogenschneider and Corbett have decades of personal 
experience in seeking EBP and have considerable credibility in 
the field. Founded in 1966, the IRP was the first federally 
sponsored academic think-tank devoted to “poverty-related 
investigations.”64 Based on their experience with poverty-
related investigations, a hot-button political issue, and 
qualitative research of EBP efforts in the United States, 
Bogenschneider and Corbett concluded that the 
 
story of U.S. social policy reveals a disturbing 
disconnect between the research community . . . 
and the policymaking community. . . . Although 
the quality of research has expanded 
dramatically in recent decades, its role in 
shaping policy decisions seldom matches the 
level warranted by the magnitude of the 
investment in science by government and the 
philanthropic communities, among others. This 
is a conundrum demanding thoughtful 
attention.65 
 
There are of course exceptions to this general disconnect. For 
instance, the fact that the Advisory Committee values 
evaluative research in its policymaking66 is a key motivation 
behind this Article. Such exceptions notwithstanding, however, 
most commentators appear to concur with this dismal 
assessment.67 A presidential candidate’s “love of data” was once 
 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976376. For an argument that empirical 
research of civil rulemaking is somewhat an exercise in futility because it has 
not resulted in actual rules change, see infra note 107. 
63. BOGENSCHNEIDER & CORBETT, supra note 18, at iii. 
64. Id. at 6. 
65. Id. at ix. 
66. For further discussion, see infra Part II.B.1. 
67. BRIDGING RESEARCH AND POLICY IN DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE AND THE 
CHANGE PROCESS ix (Julius Court et al., eds., 2005); Huw Davies et al., 
Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice in Public Services, in WHAT 
13
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criticized by a commentator who stated: “See how many votes 
data gets you!”68 Perhaps such pessimism is not surprising 
because “politics is more about the art of the possible or 
generally acceptable than what is rational or might work 
best.”69 In general, policymaking in a democracy,70 particularly 
in the United States,71 appears to be based on evidence 
selectively, if at all. 
 
 
 
WORKS?, supra note 18, at 31-32; RAY PAWSON, EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY: A 
REALIST PERSPECTIVE viii, 1-2 (2006). 
68. Howard Fineman, Rep. Paul Ryan VP Choice Draws Criticism from 
Some Conservatives, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 11, 2012, 2:55 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/howard-fineman/rep-paul-ryan-
vp_b_1768137.html. In an interview with former President Bill Clinton, 
comedian Jon Stewart satirically demonstrated this disconnect when he 
quipped: 
 
The idea that you would use (thunderous applause and 
laughter) you would use in your argument; I know, this is 
interesting; that you thought that you would utilize in your 
argument . . . facts (laughter). And they would have; you 
would attach numbers to them that were real (laughter). I 
thought it was a bold choice on your part. 
 
hungrycoyote, President Bill Clinton: “The problem with any ideology . . .” 
UPDATED with transcripts of both parts, DAILY KOS (Sept. 21, 2012, 3:28 
AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/09/21/1134679/-President-Bill-
Clinton-The-problem-with-any-ideology. 
69. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice 
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 14 (citation omitted). 
70. Id. at 30. 
71. Id. at 31-32. British researchers ironically observed that the U.S. 
might have the best evidence and the worst EBP: 
 
The apparent lack of influence of social scientists in the 
USA may seem surprising given the USA’s strong 
reputation for policy analysis and evaluation. There seems 
to be an inverse relationship operating here. The USA has a 
reputation for careful evaluation research but in the 
fragmented and decentralized political economy of that 
country this is often single-issue research, focusing on short-
run effects and used for political ammunition rather than 
policy planning. 
 
Id. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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A. Policymaking Selectively Based on Evidence 
 
The personal experience of two thoughtful, respected, 
policymaking experts demonstrates the selective use of 
evidence in American legislation.72 First, Ron Haskins has 
examined welfare policy from the perspective of the federal 
government, the academy, and the non-governmental 
organization (NGO) domain.73 In light of Haskins’s extensive 
welfare policy experience in government, the academy, and 
NGOs, he is well-informed to opine on the state of EBP in 
federal welfare policy. When asked by welfare policy academics 
how influential research was in an ongoing contentious 
congressional debate about welfare reform, Haskins estimated, 
based upon his personal experience, that “the best research 
might exert 5% of the total influence on the policy debate, with 
 
72. The complex nature of policymaking makes quantitative studies of 
EBP effectiveness methodologically difficult. As a result, most EBP 
effectiveness studies tend to be qualitative. Cf. Guzelian & Pfaff, supra note 
62, at 8-9 & n.17 (limiting their empirical research to quantitative data). 
Ironically, there is “little evidence” that EBP actually works. “It remains an 
act of faith.” Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and 
Practice in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 29-31. There is 
thereby a need for empirical research on the impact of empirical research on 
law and policy-making. Partington, supra note 28, at 1003. 
73. Haskins served in the U.S. federal government as President George 
W. Bush’s Senior Advisor for Welfare Policy; Majority Staff Director, 
Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. 
House of Representatives; and Welfare Counsel, Republican Staff, 
Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. 
House of Representatives. Ron Haskins, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 
http://www.brookings.edu/experts/haskinsr (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). He 
also served in the academic field as a Research Professor at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Frank Porter Graham Child Development 
Center. Id. At present, he is a policy expert at the non-profit Brookings 
Institution, where he is Co-Director of the Center on Children and Families, 
an Expert for the Budgeting for National Priorities Project, and a Senior 
Fellow for the Economic Studies Program. Id. Haskins also is a Senior 
Consultant at the Annie E. Casey Foundation and a Senior Editor of the joint 
Princeton University-Brookings journal The Future of Children. Id; see also 
About, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, 
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/about/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
The Future of Children even has an EBP mission, “to translate the best social 
science research about children and youth into information that is useful to 
policymakers, practitioners, grant-makers, advocates, the media, and 
students of public policy.” Id. 
15
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an upside potential of 10%.”74 He added that “[p]ersonal values 
and political power” were “what really mattered in Congress.”75 
Second, an anonymous “distinguished state welfare official, 
who also has held a top research-oriented position in the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services,” provided another 
example of how narrowly policymakers can view evidence.76 
The anonymous official managed to convince a “key” Florida 
state legislator to sponsor welfare reform legislation. When 
critiquing the draft bill, the official “asked for additional 
resources to evaluate whether the proposed changes might be 
effective.”77 The Florida legislator responded “with incredulity: 
‘If you don’t know whether or not the program is going to work, 
why are you asking me to sponsor it?’”78 From that statement, 
the legislator demonstrated ignorance of both the (un)certainty 
of policy research and the continuing need to evaluate policy in 
action. Objective baseline descriptive data are essential not 
only to formulate policy but also to evaluate its subsequent 
effectiveness. 
 
B. The Need for Objective Baseline Descriptive Data 
 
As Sherlock Holmes observed, “It is a capital mistake to 
theorize before you have all the evidence. It biases the 
judgment.”79 It is axiomatic that before you can even attempt to 
solve a problem, you first must diagnose the problem. For 
example, if your problem is financial debt, spending more than 
you make, then the first step is to diagnose how you currently 
spend your money. After meticulously tracking how you spend 
every penny over a month, you then would have enough 
diagnostic descriptive data to start making decisions about how 
to change your spending patterns and solve your debt problem. 
Any changes you made before collecting the diagnostic 
descriptive data would be based upon feeling or hunch. 
 
74. BOGENSCHNEIDER & CORBETT, supra note 18, at 1. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, A STUDY IN SCARLET 27 (Simon & Brown 
1979) (1887). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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“Lawyers, including judges and law professors, have been lazy 
about subjecting their hunches—which in honesty we should 
admit are often little better than prejudices—to systematic 
empirical testing.”80 
After carefully reviewing this “evidence,” you might create 
a new “policy”—a new monthly budget. After implementing 
this new budget, you would still want to continue to track your 
actual spending to determine whether your policy in action was 
working to solve your problem and lower your debt. After 
reviewing this additional descriptive evidence, you might 
tweak your budget further. Each time you revise your policy, 
you will want to continue to collect and review additional 
descriptive evidence to evaluate your policy’s factual success in 
solving your problem. 
While this example is admittedly much simpler than most 
contemporary public policy problems, it illustrates a 
fundamental need for baseline descriptive data to evaluate the 
success of any policy in solving problems. The “best way to 
define something as a problem ‘in our profoundly numerical 
contemporary culture’ is to measure it.”81 Descriptive data 
simply “describe[] the state of the world.”82 Because law is the 
primary means by which governments implement policy, “it 
seems logical to suggest that policymakers should have as 
much understanding as possible of how law works in the real 
world.”83 Roscoe Pound observed the disparity between the “law 
in books” and the “law in action.”84 It is well understood that 
policies once implemented in the real world may have 
unintended results. The only way to examine such unintended 
results comprehensively is through descriptive data. 
 
80. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 366, 367 (1986). 
81. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and 
the Politics of Ideas: Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 71, 
91 (quoting DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 136 
(1988)). 
82. ROBERT LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 29-30 (2010). 
83. Partington, supra note 28, at 1006. 
84. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 
15 (1910) (“[T]he distinction between legal theory and judicial administration 
is often a very real and a very deep one.”). 
17
RHEE Final 2/28/2013 9:47 PM 
2013] EVIDENCE-BASED FED. CIVIL RULEMAKING 77 
For descriptive data to serve as a baseline for policy 
debates, however, that data must be truly objective.85 All sides 
in a policy debate must accept the descriptive data’s relevance, 
representativeness, and reliability.86 In the civil litigation 
context, the accurate description of litigation lawsuits is 
essential to knowledgeable policymaking about litigation 
 
85. In an important forthcoming article, Mark Spottswood proposes a 
measurement protocol for measuring “[o]utcome accuracy—meaning a 
correspondence between the factual understandings that motivate legal 
decisionmakers and the historical facts that gave rise to litigation.” Mark 
Spottswood, Evidence-Based Litigation Reform, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 25, 
27 (2012). His protocol “entails obtaining a record of what facts motivate 
those who are responsible for producing legal outcomes, and then comparing 
those beliefs with the results of a more detailed, in-depth investigation into 
the factual background of the case.” Id. Unlike Spottswood’s outcome-
accuracy data, this Article’s descriptive data focuses on objective factual case 
outcomes over which all parties in a lawsuit could agree (e.g., was the motion 
to dismiss granted?) without evaluating whether these factual case outcomes 
accurately reflect the underlying facts of the case and a fair understanding of 
such facts by a reasonable judge (e.g., was the grant of summary judgment 
accurate because the plaintiff’s claim lacked merit?). Although a particular 
district court could implement Spottswood’s outcome-accuracy protocol as 
part of the voluntary coding of the proposed Rule, see infra Part IV.B, as 
Spottswood himself recognizes, it would “be expensive and difficult” to 
implement his outcome-accuracy protocol in every newly filed CM/ECF case. 
Spottswood, supra, at 29. Because parties most likely would disagree over the 
perceived accuracy of such case outcomes, coding such accuracy would 
probably require his experimental protocol and “reference-standard 
evaluators” in nearly every case. Id. at 85. Nevertheless, Spottswood is 
correct that 
 
[s]o long as we fail to measure accuracy, information about 
the variables we can track cannot provide a strong platform 
on which to base rule-design decisions, because we can 
never be sure that the improvements in other procedural 
values are not coming at the expense of the system’s 
accuracy. 
 
Id. at 29. In the final analysis, much like using both inexpensive 
observational data such as “cholesterol levels or blood pressure” and 
“something that is harder to measure, like long-term changes in mortality or 
subjective assessments of overall patient well-being” in medicine, id. at 68, 
both this Article’s outcome-based descriptive data and Spottswood’s outcome-
accuracy data can prove useful in analyzing the effectiveness of the rules. 
There is value in using both “easily measurable surrogate outcomes and also 
more subjective ultimate outcomes of deeper theoretic interest, depending on 
the specific goals of an investigation.” Id. at 81. 
86. See Solesbury, supra note 18, at 8-9. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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reform.87 Given the proliferation of partisan pressure groups 
happy to manufacture self-serving, subjective “evidence,”88 
there is a danger of evidence overload. Furthermore, different 
academic disciplines and different research cultures disagree 
over the objectivity of various research methods.89 If 
policymakers mistrust all evidence as loaded, then they might 
feel justified paradoxically to ignore evidence altogether.90 
Objective baseline descriptive data would prevent such a 
paradox. 
Because descriptive data are simple, so long as its 
collection and coding process is transparent, the most jaded 
ideologues and most doctrinaire academics would have 
difficulty spinning its interpretation. If there is popular 
consensus over the accuracy of descriptive data, then there 
should be greater popular support for EBP rationally based 
upon such data. Even if ideologues and academics continue to 
argue over the correct interpretation of such descriptive data, 
the descriptive data will have served their public purpose of 
providing a shared baseline upon which to ground policy 
debates. The distinction between descriptive data and their 
normative interpretation parallels the distinction between 
positive economics and normative economics.91 
 
87. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything about the 
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1147, 1149 (1992). 
88. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
89. See Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and 
Practice in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 3; Rhee, supra 
note 4, at 1317. 
90. Elizabeth Warren has pointed out that there is a “vigorous market 
for data” in the policymaking world, often “to support foregone conclusions.” 
Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social 
Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 3. “Ironically, the power of 
this market threatens to crush serious, policy-directed, empirical work. . . . 
Indeed, the market is creating an anti-market in which one study seems to 
contradict another, leaving policymakers free to ignore all data and making 
such scholarship not only difficult, but useless.” Id. at 3-4. 
91. Whereas “positive economics” are descriptive statements “about how 
the world is,” “normative economics” are proscriptive statements “about how 
the world ought to be.” N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 
31, 136, 491 (6th ed. 2010). Peter Boettke uses a “devil’s test” to distinguish 
between the two. Under this test, “the analysis could be agreed upon by either 
an angel or the devil, but the angel and devil would differ on the normative 
implications.” PETER J. BOETTKE, LIVING ECONOMICS: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND, 
19
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Ideally, independent, professional civil servants similar to 
the U.S. Census Bureau92 would be responsible for collecting, 
disseminating, maintaining, and improving such descriptive 
data. Not only could impartial civil servants safeguard the 
data’s objectivity, but also such professionals could 
dispassionately assess partisan criticisms of their research 
methodology and make constructive improvements.93 Over 
time, all legitimate sides in a policy debate could accept in good 
faith that the relevant descriptive data provide a fair factual 
starting point. This fair starting point is even more important 
in light of the increasingly partisan nature of modern media, 
where anyone can obtain her news only from sources that share 
her own ideological bias.94 Even the fairest starting point, 
however, is useful only if lawmakers actually agree to use it as 
shared common ground. 
 
C. A Paradigm Shift 
 
Perhaps the most common objection to EBP is that the 
“variables underlying” policymaking cannot “be quantified and 
 
TOMORROW 28-29 (2012). This test distinguishes “economic knowledge from 
normative concerns or preferences.” Diana Weinert Thomas & Michael David 
Thomas, Encouraging a Productive Research Agenda: Peter Boettke and the 
Devil’s Test, 26 J. PRIV. ENTER. 103, 104 (2010). 
92. The Constitution and a federal statute mandate that the U.S. 
Census Bureau every decade collect demographic information about the 
United States “to draw political boundaries, allocate funds to state and local 
governments, and track a wide range of demographic and economic 
information.” Brendan Kearns, Down for the Count: Overcoming the Census 
Bureau’s Neglect of the Homeless, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 155, 160 (2012) 
(citations omitted). 
93. For a discussion on the role of a proposed National Academy of 
Justice to oversee the FCCEDD, see infra notes 450-55 and accompanying 
text. 
94. For example, former Vice President Cheney may watch only Fox 
News, and lawyer and consumer advocate Ralph Nader may read only 
Mother Jones. AYRES, supra note 34, at 21; see also Lymari Morales, 
Americans’ Confidence in Television News Drops to New Low, GALLUP (July 
10, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155585/Americans-Confidence-
Television-News-Drops-New-Low.aspx (surveyed adults expressing “a great 
deal or quite a lot of confidence” in U.S. TV news was twenty-one percent and 
in U.S. newspapers was twenty-five percent). All policymakers need to be 
exposed not only to challenging opposing points of view, but also to objective 
facts that transcend political spin. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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reduced to a non-discretionary algorithm.”95 Even assuming 
this is true, policy nevertheless can be empirically tested to see 
if it is actually achieving the promised or expected outcomes.96 
Nothing beats results. By analogy, although modeling the 
detailed intricacies of a football team’s play calling and 
execution might be extremely difficult, we can check the final 
score of its games or the team’s overall win-loss record to 
determine whether the team is actually achieving its desired 
results. 
Although lawyers have long used empirical research 
instrumentally as another tool in their advocacy toolkit,97 for 
EBP to succeed, American lawyers—who have a monopoly on 
the judicial branch and dominate the executive and legislative 
branches and private corporations98—must shift their 
policymaking paradigm. After all, law remains the principal 
tool of social and economic policy.99 
EBP requires true empirical research.100 True empirical 
research is not another argument that happens to use 
statistics.101 EBP requires rigorously testing every factual 
assumption with careful observations of the world.102 The 
strongest argument in support of a particular policy is to 
 
95. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice 
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 103. 
96. See id. For a definition of “outcomes,” see supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. 
97. See Elizabeth Mertz, Introduction to THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN 
LAW i (Elizabeth Mertz ed. 2008). 
98. “Although members of the legal profession constitute approximately 
two-thirds of 1 percent of the working adult population in the United States, 
they hold a high proportion of the positions with formal directing authority in 
government relative to the members of all other occupations.” Neil Hamilton, 
Ethical Leadership in Professional Life, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 358, 361 (2009). 
99. See Partington, supra note 28, at 1006. 
100. See supra notes 22-25, 28-30 and accompanying text. In practice, 
even social science and medical academics fall short of this empirical ideal. 
See Theodore Eisenberg, Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal 
Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1730 n.66 
(collecting authorities). But most social science and medical academics would 
probably accept this ideal, at least theoretically, whereas some lawyers and 
legal academics might reject it outright. 
101. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2002). 
102. Id. at 2-3. 
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challenge that policy with the “best possible opposing 
arguments.”103 Instead of cherry picking only the empirical 
research that happens to agree with an arbitrary adversarial 
position,104 EBP requires a sincere commitment to the 
principles of “empiricism—basing conclusions on observation or 
experimentation—and inference—using facts we know to learn 
about facts we do not know.”105 Because of the importance of 
empirical evidence, familiarity with empirical methods 
sufficient to be a good consumer of empirical research is an 
essential lawyering skill.106 Over the last two decades, federal 
civil rulemaking has demonstrated a growing commitment to 
both empiricism and inference.107 
 
 
 
 
 
103. Id. at 10. 
104. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
105. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 2 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). Epstein and King explain the disparity between the idealized EBP 
paradigm of a social science PhD and the idealized adversarial paradigm of a 
litigator: 
 
While a Ph.D. is taught to subject his or her favored 
hypothesis to every conceivable test and data source, 
seeking out all possible evidence against his or her theory, 
an attorney is taught to amass all the evidence for his or her 
hypothesis and distract attention from anything that might 
be seen as contradictory information. An attorney who 
treats a client like a hypothesis would be disbarred; a Ph.D. 
who advocates a hypothesis like a client would be ignored. 
 
Id. at 9. 
106. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 1. Such familiarity also would 
make lawyers into better advocates, better able to self-diagnose the quality of 
her own empirical research and to criticize the flaws of her adversary’s 
empirical research. 
107. Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Bryant Garth are less sanguine about 
empiricism’s lasting impact upon federal civil rulemaking. In their opinion, 
although past history demonstrates cycles of increasing empirical research in 
rulemaking, the end result consistently has been little-to-no actual change in 
the rules. Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow & Bryant G. Garth, Civil Procedure and 
Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 679, 695 
(Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds. 2010). 
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II. Empirical Research of Federal Civil Rulemaking 
 
Empirical research of federal civil rulemaking had humble 
beginnings. When drafting the original Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the first Advisory Committee did not utilize any 
empirical research. After maintaining this neglect for fifty 
years, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee began 
commissioning the Federal Judicial Center (the “FJC”) to 
conduct empirical research of the Rules only in 1988.108 
Although in 1978 Chief Justice Warren Berger commissioned a 
FJC study of controlled experimentation of rules changes109 
and several academics have since recommended such 
experimental research,110 experimentation has yet to be 
adopted in a consistent and comprehensive manner throughout 
the federal courts.111 Meanwhile, both the Advisory Committee 
and the legal academy have subsequently embraced empirical 
research.112 
 
108. Willging, supra note 23, at 1143 tbl.1. 
109. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT 
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION 
IN THE LAW, at v (1981). 
110. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive 
Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 683 (1998) (stating it is 
“encouraging” that the advisory committee “has commissioned empirical 
research in advance of possible rulemaking”); Laurens Walker, Avoiding 
Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The Role of Economic Analysis, 23 
J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 572 (1994) (discussing the positive benefits of using 
empirical research, but stating that existing research should be utilized due 
to cost and barriers to institutional reform). 
111. Although an amendment to Rule 83 allowing experimental rules 
testing was proposed in 1991, it was never adopted. See Committee on Rules 
of Practice & Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed 
Rules: Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991). 
112. Not everyone agrees, however, with the objectivity of empirical 
studies on civil rulemaking. For example, Menkel-Meadow and Garth have 
concluded that 
 
[E]mpirical studies of how rules actually operate have, for 
the most part, been used in partisan ways to advocate for 
particular reforms in the interests of one or another legal or 
client constituency. . . . Only relatively rarely has empirical 
study of civil procedure been conducted by more 
disinterested or “neutral” social scientists and legal 
scholars. . . . Indeed, . . . many of those conducting or 
23
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A. Humble Beginnings 
 
Several careful historical studies have extensively 
examined the original intent of the Founding Fathers113 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.114 While these “lionized”115 
Founding Fathers created a “Big Bang” by completely 
remaking “the civil justice system in America,”116 the first rules 
they created in 1938 were based upon “little empirical 
evidence.”117 Empirical legal research at that time was in its 
methodological infancy.118 Although Charles Clark—the 
Reporter of the first Rules Advisory Committee119—did employ 
empirical research to study civil procedure,120 his results were 
often ignored or rejected.121 Even back then, there was a 
 
commissioning empirical studies of civil procedural 
processes have been directly involved as advocates for 
particular procedural reforms. 
 
Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 680. 
113. The original Advisory Committee was composed entirely of men. 
See Order, Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and 
Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774, 774-75 (1935) (listing original Advisory Committee 
names). 
114. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 
U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1025 (1982); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and 
Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 
371, 371-73 (2010); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in 
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 496-98 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 912-14 (1987). 
115. Coquillette, supra note 51, at 685. 
116. Kravitz, supra note 45, at 215. 
117. Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for 
Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 782 (1993). 
118. John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical 
Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195, 
196 (1980); see also Wheeler, supra note 50, at 31-33. 
119. Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 85 YALE. L.J. 914, 915 (1976). Charles Clark was the Dean of 
Yale Law School and a Federal Judge, sitting on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. 
120. John Henry Schlegel & David Trubek, Charles E. Clark and the 
Reform of Legal Education, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 108-11 
(Peninah Petruck ed. 1991); see MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 233, 312 & n.85 (1992) (describing how “one of the 
earliest examples of an emerging actuarial argument” in a case was dicta). 
121. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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“tension between norm-oriented lawyers and number-
crunching social scientists.”122 Clark reportedly lamented that 
all that was expected from empirical research was more 
“interpretation” and fewer facts.123 Clark, however, helped 
create the precursor system124 of today’s federal court 
statistical data system.125 
The fact that empirical research did not inform the original 
1938 rules highlights the need for empirical testing of the 
current rules. Although the combined experience of the First 
Advisory Committee provided a form of qualitative evidence, 
they do not appear to have used any methodologically rigorous, 
testable empirical research.126 The original rules passed into 
law automatically in 1938 without a congressional vote.127 
Because of the slow, conflict-adverse nature of federal civil 
rulemaking,128 many of the assumptions in the original 1938 
rules remain untested in the current version of the Federal 
Rules.129 
Here are two examples that illustrate the problems 
underlying untested assumptions. The first could be considered 
pro-defendant whereas the second could be considered pro-
plaintiff. First, Rules 1 and 81130 make clear that the rules are 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 8-11, 113-14 (1995); Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and 
Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the 
New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 831 & n.59 [hereinafter Heise, 
Past, Present, and Future]; David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. 
REV. 433, 504-05 (2010). 
122. Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 685. 
123. SCHLEGEL, supra note 121, at 94. 
124. See Will Shafroth, Federal Judicial Statistics, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 200, 205 (1948). 
125. See 28 U.S.C. §604(a)(2), (b) (2006). Current federal court statistics 
are available online. See Statistics, U.S. CRTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2012). 
126. For a definition of empirical research, see supra note 23. 
127. Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our 
Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 297 (1994). 
128. See Kravitz, supra note 45, at 213, 215-17. 
129. See generally Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: 
Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal 
Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1989) (describing the uncertainty within the 
current debate over the procedure crisis). 
130. FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 81. 
25
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transsubstantive as they apply to most federal civil lawsuits 
regardless of the nature of the parties or the underlying 
claim.131 The original Advisory Committee adopted this one-
size-fits-all premise without any debate.132 However, this 
premise ignores possible power disparities in litigation. 
Transsubstantivity means that a lawsuit between two 
sophisticated corporations with tremendous resources (e.g., two 
“Goliaths”) is treated the same as a lawsuit between an 
indigent plaintiff and a defendant corporation or government 
(e.g., a “David” versus a “Goliath”). Behind transsubstantivity 
lies an implicit empirical assumption—that subjecting Davids 
to the same rules as Goliaths will not affect the outcome. In 
other words, transsubstantivity assumes that there is no need 
to have different procedural rules for lawsuits between 
Goliaths and lawsuits between Davids and Goliaths, because 
the final disposition would be the same under either procedural 
regime. Considerable empirical research casts doubt on this 
assumption.133 
Second, Martin Redish and Colleen McNamara have 
questioned another foundational presumption of the original 
rules, that discovery costs were to remain where they fell. “[A] 
party required to produce discovery requested by another party 
was—and to this day continues to be—assumed to bear 
whatever costs it incurred in the course of that production.”134 
Implicit behind this policy presumption is the empirical 
assumption that this arrangement—in the words of Rule 1—is 
the speediest and most inexpensive way to organize discovery 
in a just manner.135 Redish and McNamara traced this 
assumption back to the 
 
 
131. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive 
Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 378 (2010). 
132. Id. at 383 (footnote omitted). 
133. See, e.g., Jayanth K. Krishnan & Stewart Macaulay, Toward the 
Next Generation of Galanter-Influenced Scholars: The Influential Reach of a 
Law-and-Society Founder, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., at i (2008). 
134. Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back To the Future: 
Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 773, 774 (2011). 
135. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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[I]nertia that began with the original adoption of 
the Federal Rules in 1938. The drafters of the 
original Federal Rules failed to seriously consider 
moral, economic, or democratic first principles 
when they apparently assumed, without 
discussion, that producing parties, rather than 
requesting parties, would bear the costs of 
discovery.136 
 
Given that practitioners and judges frequently complain 
about the high discovery costs in civil litigation137 and that 
discovery costs, unlike other forms of policy, are easily 
quantifiable, it is remarkable that this original assumption has 
not been empirically tested.138 Accordingly, the current rules 
carry over empirical assumptions from the original rules that 
need to be tested and verified. Fortunately, in recent years, the 
federal civil rulemaking process has gradually accepted, and 
even institutionalized, increased empirical research of the 
rules. 
 
B. Gradual Acceptance and Institutionalization 
 
The two government organizations arguably most 
instrumental to current empirical research of the rules are the 
Civil Rules Advisory Committee and the Federal Judicial 
Center.139 
 
1. Civil Rules Advisory Committee 
 
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee (the “Advisory 
Committee”) is the modern descendant of the original Advisory 
Committee.140 During the first fifty years since enacting the 
 
136. Redish & McNamara, supra note 134, at 775. 
137. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007) 
(complaining of high discovery costs in federal civil litigation); INST. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 55, at 2. 
138. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 134, at 776. 
139. See Kravitz, supra note 45, at 216. 
140. In 1942, the Supreme Court designated the original Advisory 
Committee “a continuing Advisory Committee to advise the Court with 
27
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Federal Civil Rules, the Advisory Committee rarely referred to 
empirical research when evaluating proposed rules 
amendments.141 A 1988 bibliography of empirical research in 
civil procedure concluded, “little of merit was published prior to 
the 1960’s.”142 Before 1988, the Advisory Committee apparently 
mentioned empirical research in its notes to rules amendments 
only four times.143 In 1970, the Advisory Committee cited the 
field study produced by the Columbia Project for Effective 
Justice in support of amendments to the federal discovery 
rules.144 In 1980, the Advisory Committee cited another 
empirical study in support of its amendments to Rule 26(f).145 
Finally, in 1983, the Advisory Committee cited empirical 
studies in support of its amendments to Rules 16146 and 26(f).147 
Ironically, that same year, the Advisory Committee’s 1983 
amendments to Rule 11 were criticized as not being based upon 
any empirical research.148 
 
 
respect to proposed amendments or additions to the Rule . . . .” Continuance 
of Advisory Committee, 314 U.S. 720, 720 (1942). While the Advisory 
Committee was later “discharged with thanks” in 1956, Discharge of Advisory 
Committee, 352 U.S. 803, 803 (1956), the Advisory Committee became 
permanent in 1958. See Act of July 11, 1958, Pub.L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356. 
The annual rulemaking process is explained in 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006). See 
also Announcement, 54 Fed. Reg. 13,752 (Apr. 5, 1989) (publishing 
Procedures adopted by the Judicial Conference of the U.S. on Mar. 14, 1989); 
Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1655 (1995). 
141. Willging, supra note 23, at 1121 (citing Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 
14). 
142. Michael Chiorazzi et al., Empirical Studies in Civil Procedure: A 
Selected Annotated Bibliography, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 89 (1988); 
see Wheeler, supra note 50, at 41-42 (for a listing of major 1960’s empirical 
research in civil procedure). 
143. See Willging, supra note 23, at 1121 nn.3-4. 
144. Id. at 1121 n.3 (citing Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 25-27). 
145. Id. at 1122 n.4 (citing PAUL CONNOLLY ET AL., JUDICIAL CONTROLS 
AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978)). 
146. Id. at 1121 n.3 (citing STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND 
COURT MANAGEMENT IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (1977)). 
147. Id. at 1122 n.4 (citing CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 145). 
148. Willging, supra note 23, at 1122. In fairness to the Advisory 
Committee, there were not many reported Rule 11 decisions before the 1983 
amendments. From 1938-1983, there were a total of 25 reported Rule 11 
cases. Mark Spiegel, Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into 
the Neutrality of Procedural Rules, 32 CONN. L. REV. 155, 157 (1999). 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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Beginning in 1988, the Advisory Committee began asking 
the Federal Judicial Center (the “FJC”) for empirical studies to 
inform the Advisory Committee’s rulemaking.149 In the early 
1990s, commentators increasingly criticized the Advisory 
Committee’s failure to base its rulemaking upon empirical 
research.150 In 1993, Stephen Burbank “lament[ed]” the 
Advisory Committee’s “studied indifference to empirical 
questions” and even went so far as to call for a moratorium “on 
procedural law reform, whether by court rule or by statute, 
until such time as we know what we are doing.”151 As a 
member of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the 
“JCUS”) Standing Committee observed in 1995, “[r]esponding 
to recommendations from judges and scholars that ‘rules 
changes be predicated on a sounder empirical basis,’ the 
various rules advisory committees increased ‘their requests for 
assistance from the [FJC] to conduct research on litigation 
practices and the impact of the rules.’”152 
In 1995, the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the 
Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States (the “Subcommittee”), 
composed of Professor Thomas Baker and Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, validated this call for increased empirical 
research: 
 
It is frequently asserted, most often by academic 
critics, that federal rulemaking today is too 
dependent on anecdotal information rather than 
empirical research. Rules changes more often 
 
149. McCabe, supra note 140, at 1680 (“[T]he advisory committees have 
been increasing their requests for assistance from the [FJC] to conduct 
research on litigation practices and the impact of the rules.”). 
150. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court 
Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 323, 335 (1991); Coquillette, 
supra note 51, at 713-15; Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural 
Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 841 (1993); A. 
Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 
U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1585–94 (1991); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: 
Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. 
REV. 795, 810 (1991); Walker, supra note 110, at 572. 
151. Burbank, supra note 150, at 841-42. 
152. Willging, supra note 23, at 1141 (citing McCabe, supra note 140, at 
1680). 
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than not depend on the legal research of the 
Reporters combined with the informed judgment 
of the members of the rules committees. To make 
this argument is not necessarily to find fault 
with the model of disinterested experts as 
rulemakers. Nor does the argument deny the 
not-infrequent, well-documented instances when 
rulemakers have relied on empirical research. 
Yet not enough has been done to incorporate 
empirical research into rulemaking on a regular 
basis.153 
 
The Subcommittee encouraged the FJC to “engage in 
original rules-related empirical research to determine how 
procedures are working.”154 Finally, the Subcommittee 
recommended that the Advisory Committee “rely to the 
maximum possible extent on empirical data as a basis for 
proposing rules changes”155 and concluded that “[e]ach 
Advisory Committee should ground its proposals on available 
data and develop mechanisms for gathering and evaluating 
data that are not otherwise available, and should use these 
data to decide whether changes in existing rules should be 
proposed.”156 
Given such recommendations, the Advisory Committee not 
surprisingly increasingly referred to empirical research during 
its rulemaking deliberations. In 1995, in response to a 1994 
FJC random survey of 150 federal judges on attorney voir 
dire,157 the Advisory Committee expressed openness to 
experimental testing of Rule 47(a),158 stating that there “may 
be some room for systematic experimentation to test the 
information provided by the FJC survey of federal judges.”159 
 
153. Coquillette, supra note 51, at 699 (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Willging, supra note 23, at 1143 tbl.1. 
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a). 
159. Willging, supra note 23, at 1165 (quoting Minutes, Civ. Rules 
Advisory Comm., Rule 47(a) (Edward H. Cooper, Reporter, Apr. 18-19, 1996), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/cv4-
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
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Starting in 2004, the Advisory Committee referred more 
frequently to empirical research in its Committee minutes. 
In 2004, the Advisory Committee reviewed a FJC empirical 
study of sealed settlement agreements filed in federal courts.160 
In addition, the Advisory Committee mentioned that the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (the 
“AOUSC”) was conducting informal empirical research on Rule 
29.161 In 2005, the Advisory Committee reviewed a FJC 
empirical study on hung juries.162 In 2011, the Advisory 
Committee mentioned that many organizations other than the 
FJC “are pursuing empirical work that should shed further 
light, not only on the experience in litigation but on the all-
important questions of pre-litigation behavior.”163 
In 2010, the Advisory Committee observed that “[s]ome of 
the same information-technology changes that gave rise to 
electronic discovery also provided the promise of improved 
access to empirical information about the costs and burdens 
imposed in civil lawsuits in federal courts”164 and mentioned a 
FJC study of “federal civil cases that terminated in the last 
quarter of 2008.”165 To address conflicting empirical data 
claiming that federal civil lawsuits either suffer from “undue 
and rising cost and delay” or are “handled relatively quickly 
and efficiently,”166 the Advisory Committee invited more than 
 
1896.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
160. Minutes, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 43-44 (Edward H. Cooper, 
Reporter, Apr. 15-16, 2004), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CRAC0404
.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
161. Report of the Judicial Conference, Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Proc. 6-7 (David F. Levy et al., Reporters, Mar. 2004), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST3-
2004.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
162. Minutes, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 19-20 (Edward H. Cooper, 
Reporter, Oct. 27-28, 2005), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV11-
2005-min.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
163. Report to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 99 (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-
2010.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
164. Id. at 189. 
165. Id. 
166. Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice 
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seventy people to a Litigation Review Conference in May 
2010.167 The Advisory Committee intended to focus Part I of the 
Conference on empirical research as “a cornerstone.”168 
Prominently discussed at the Conference was a practitioner 
opinion survey concerning whether the civil rules were 
“conducive to meeting the Rule 1 goals of just, speedy, and 
inexpensive” litigation.169 The Advisory Committee also noted 
that a “great amount of empirical data was assembled in 
preparation” for this Conference and that the “rich and detailed 
data generated by all this work provided an important anchor 
for Conference discussion and will be a basis for further 
assessment of the federal civil justice system for years to 
come.”170 
In 2011, the Advisory Committee referred to an FJC study 
concerning the frequency of spoliation motions in federal court 
and recommended more “pilot projects testing new procedures” 
to “provide fertile sources of information for considering future 
rules amendments.”171 Such pilot programs “work best,” 
observed the Advisory Committee, “when they are framed from 
the beginning in ways that will enable the [FJC] to provide 
rigorous evaluation of the results.”172 With regard to a motion 
 
and Procedure 18 (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-
2010.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
167. Id. 
168. Minutes, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 30 (Edward H. Cooper, 
Reporter, Apr. 20-21, 2009), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV04-
2009-min.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
169. Minutes, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 7 (Edward H. Cooper, 
Reporter, Mar. 18-19, 2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV03-
2010-min.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
170. Report to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 189 (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-
2010.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
171. Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell to Hon. Mark R. 
Kravitz Regarding the Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 7 (Dec. 
2, 2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-
2011.pdf. 
172. Minutes, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 4 (Edward H. Cooper, 
Reporter, Nov. 7-8, 2011) [hereinafter Nov. 7-8 Advisory Committee 
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to dismiss study, both authors of the original FJC study173 and 
the law professor critique174 addressed the Advisory 
Committee.175 The Advisory Committee also mentioned four 
other motion to dismiss empirical studies176 and reviewed the 
preliminary results of a Rule 16(b) survey.177 
The FJC’s chief empiricist to the Advisory Committee 
concluded in 2002 that the Advisory Committee “has 
established a pattern of continuing consultation with the FJC 
and other empirical researchers about empirical questions. 
Such consultations occur before the Advisory Committee 
proposes rules changes, while it reviews and hears comments 
on proposals that have been made, and while it deliberates 
about those proposals.”178 Many of the empirical studies upon 
which the Advisory Committee has relied on were completed by 
the FJC.179 
 
2. Federal Judicial Center 
 
Congress created the FJC in 1967.180 Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, who chaired the Warren Commission investigating 
President Kennedy’s assassination,181 used his personal 
influence with President Lyndon Johnson to have the FJC’s 
appropriation placed in a crime control bill.182 The authorizing 
 
Minutes], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV11-
2011-min.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
173. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
174. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
175. Nov. 7-8 Advisory Committee Minutes, supra note 172, at 53. 
176. Report to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 226-28 (May 2, 2011), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-
2011.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
177. Id. at 275. 
178. Willging, supra note 23, at 1141-42 (footnote omitted). 
179. See id. 
180. Wheeler, supra note 50, at 38-41. 
181. Id. at 40. 
182. Id.; see also Landmark Judicial Legislation: Establishment of the 
Federal Judicial Center, FED. JUD. CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_18.html (last visited Oct. 
27, 2012). 
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legislation stated that the FJC “will enable the courts to begin 
the kind of self-analysis, research and planning necessary for a 
more effective judicial system.”183 
The FJC’s statutory mission is “to conduct research and 
study of the operation of the courts of the United States, and to 
stimulate and coordinate such research and study on the part 
of other public and private persons and agencies.”184 To 
maintain the integrity of its research, the FJC, while 
considered part of the judicial branch, is organizationally 
independent from the AOUSC185 and the rest of the judicial 
branch.186 As the Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Ad Hoc Committee 
observed, “[i]n matters relating to research and the formulation 
of conclusions, the FJC should have complete independence to 
explore ideas and proposals and to make evaluations, whether 
or not their findings comport generally with the findings of the” 
AOUSC.187 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that both the 
FJC and the AOUSC were “separate but mutually reinforcing 
support agencies . . . provid[ing] the courts and the [JCUS] 
complementary services and, on occasional major matters of 
policy, diverse perspectives that benefit the decision-making 
process.”188 The FJC has occasionally disagreed with the 
JCUS’s policy recommendations.189 The FJC’s “independence, 
 
183. Wheeler, supra note 50, at 39 & n.52 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
184. 28 U.S.C. § 620(b)(l) (2006). See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
185. Wheeler, supra note 50, at 50-51. 
186. Although the FJC is “governed by judges,” it remains “independent 
within the judicial branch.” Schwarzer, supra note 50, at 1134. The FJC is a 
“separate agency ‘within the judicial branch,’ rather than as part of or 
reporting to another component of the judiciary.” Id. at 1135 (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 620(a) (2006)). Although the FJC’s Board is composed of federal 
judges (and the AOUSC’s Director ex officio), judges are forbidden from 
serving on both the FJC’s Board and the Judicial Conference at the same 
time. 28 U.S.C. § 621 (2006). The Board also appoints the FJC’s Director. 28 
U.S.C. § 623 (2006). 
187. Schwarzer, supra note 50, at 1141 (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
188. William H. Rehnquist, 1992 Year-End Report on the Federal 
Judiciary, reprinted in 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 609, 615 (1993). 
189. For example, the FJC at least twice has recommended continuing 
pilot programs over the Judicial Conference’s objection. See Schwarzer, supra 
note 50, at 1141-42. 
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the value of which is generally accepted, is tempered, however, 
by the necessity of maintaining a productive working 
relationship with the [Judicial] Conference and its 
committees.”190 
Because of the AOUSC’s statutory responsibility to collect 
“statistical data and reports as to the business of the courts,”191 
however, the FJC works closely with the AOUSC. Much like 
the legislative branch’s Congressional Research Service192 or 
Government Accountability Office,193 the judicial branch’s FJC 
enjoys a credible nonpartisan reputation of professional 
independence.194 Much of the FJC’s research is empirical 
research commissioned by the Advisory Committee, the JCUS, 
or Congress.195 Since 1988, the FJC has completed many 
empirical studies at the Advisory Committee’s request 
concerning Rules 1, 11, 12, 16, 23, 26, 26-37, 47, 53, 56, 58, and 
68.196 
Although it is the official research arm of the federal 
judiciary, the FJC of course is not the only game in town. The 
FJC’s empirical research interacts with other public and 
private research. In fact, there is a “small industry” of 
empirical researchers “oriented toward the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in the United States and measurement and 
comparison of the efficiency of rules and processes outside of 
the United States.”197 For example, Professor Lonny Hoffman 
 
190. Id. at 1140. 
191. 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2) (2006). Scholars have criticized the reliability 
of the AOUSC’s data. See infra note 442 and accompanying text. 
192. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional 
Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1316-17 (2001). 
193. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Response, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. SEE ALSO 1, 6 (2010). 
194. See Wheeler, supra note 50, at 51 & n.142 (citing Gordon Bermant 
& Russell Wheeler, From Within the System: Educational and Research 
Programs at the Federal Judicial Center, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF 
CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 102, 143 (Gary B. Melton ed. 1987)) (the FJC 
now has nearly one hundred personnel positions and a low turnover rate). 
195. See generally Wheeler, supra note 50, at 41 & n.72 (describing the 
“research function” of the FJC). 
196. See Willging, supra note 23, at 1143 tbl.1; see also supra notes 148-
78. 
197. Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 695. 
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criticized198 the FJC’s recent empirical study199 of federal civil 
pleading in response to the Supreme Court’s seminal decisions 
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly200 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.201 
Hoffman’s empirical critique reflects the increasing popularity 
of empirical research in the legal academy. 
 
C. The New Legal Realist Study of Civil Litigation 
 
In addition to the Advisory Committee’s increasing desire 
to base its rulemaking upon empirical evidence202 and the 
FJC’s increasing expertise in empirical research,203 another 
reason why the present time is ideal for evidence-based federal 
civil rulemaking is the current renaissance of the empirical 
study of law in the legal academy. “For the first time in at least 
a generation, serious empirical research appears to be taking 
root and blossoming within the legal academy.”204 
Commentators have bestowed loosely defined labels such as 
Empirical Legal Studies (“ELS”) and New Legal Realism 
(“NLR”) on this scholarly movement.205 Although the original 
legal realists206 long ago advocated the use of empirical 
methods to study law,207 a perfect storm of an increasing 
 
198. See generally Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An 
Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 
FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
199. Joe Cecil, et al., Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after 
Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 10 & tbl.2, 21 (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf. 
200. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
201. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
202. See supra Part II.B.1 for further discussion. 
203. See supra Part II.B.2 for further discussion. 
204. Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal 
Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 555, 556 (2010). 
205. Id; see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal 
Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834–35 (2008). 
206. “[L]egal realism” is a loose label for “legal commentators, primarily 
from the 1930s and 1940s,” who sought to enable “citizens, lawyers, and 
judges to understand what was really going on behind the jargon and 
mystification of the law.” BIX, supra note 56, at 3 (emphasis in original). 
207. The celebrated American jurist Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
himself wrote in 1897, “[f]or the rational study of the law . . . the man of the 
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number of empirically trained Ph.D.s entering the legal 
academy,208 the easy availability of powerful statistical 
software programs that run on a personal computer,209 the 
proliferation of educational empirical legal resources,210 and 
the increasing prestige of empirical legal scholarship in the 
legal academy211 joined to contribute to the emergence of NLR. 
Like the legal realist empiricists before them, these New 
Legal Realists share “a desire to inject serious empirical 
inquiry into legal and policy debates.”212 “Law and” social 
scientists, of course, have long employed empirical techniques 
to study law.213 In the civil litigation context, political scientists 
have used empirical research to study judicial decision-
making,214 social psychologists have used empirical research to 
study procedural justice,215 and the Law and Society Movement 
has “sought to promote dialog between empirical social science 
and law.”216 Like Law and Society, NLR “embraces a ground-
level up perspective that draws attention to the effect of law on 
the everyday lives of ordinary people—in addition to the 
 
future is the man of statistics.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 
78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 708 (1998); see also, e.g., SCHLEGEL, supra note 121, at 8-
11, 113-14; Heise, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 121, at 823; Herbert 
M. Kritzer, Empirical Legal Studies Before 1940: A Bibliographic Essay, 6 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 925, 926 (2009). 
208. Michael Heise, Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship 
Production, 1990-2009, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1739, 1747-48 n.22 [hereinafter 
Heise, Empirical Analysis]. 
209. See, e.g., LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 171. 
210. For example, the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies has 
become “perhaps the largest annual refereed academic legal conference in the 
world.” Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 1713. There is an Oxford Handbook of 
Empirical Research and a law school casebook. Id. at 1714. Centers for 
empirical legal research have been established at the University of 
California, Los Angeles, Cornell, Washington University, Harvard, and 
Berkeley. Id. 
211. See Heise, Empirical Analysis, supra note 208, at 1741. 
212. Suchman & Mertz, supra note 204, at 557. 
213. Id. at 556. 
214. See, e.g., id. at 559; see also Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky & Jonathan L. 
Williams, Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1174 (2009). 
215. See, e.g., Suchman & Mertz, supra note 204, at 559; see also 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the 
Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 138 (2011). 
216. Suchman & Mertz, supra note 204, at 567. 
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experiences of elites and professionals.”217 Social scientists 
understandably might ask, why all the fuss now? We’ve been 
here the whole time. 
The difference is that this empiricism is centered within 
the legal academy itself.218 By seeking “to legitimate empirical 
research within the legal academy itself,”219 ELS and NLR may 
facilitate greater use of and respect for empiricism in the 
general legal profession.220 The vast majority of American 
lawyers and judges must spend three years in law school before 
becoming a member of the Bar.221 While there remains 
grumbling over the relationship between the legal academy 
and the practicing Bar,222 because of this training pipeline 
connection, unlike outside researchers from other “law and” 
disciplines,223 legal academics and legal practitioners are 
considered part of the same legal profession.224 Consequently, 
“legal scholarship—perhaps to a greater degree and more 
immediately than most other research—has the potential to 
influence public policy as it is promulgated by judges, 
legislators, and bureaucrats.”225 
 
217. Id. at 561. 
218. Id. at 556; see also Karen Sloan, Empiricism Divides the Academy: 
Upstart Number-Crunchers Attract Praise and Derision, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 28, 
2011, at A1. 
219. Suchman & Mertz, supra note 204, at 556. 
220. Accord Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 1728-29 (stating that ELS has 
helped law professors not trained in other “law and” disciplines recognize 
that the “empirical study of law is a tool that might be considered for use by 
any legal scholar when an empirical issue is of interest”). 
221. See, e.g., Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, 
and Application of Enactment, Implementation, or Repeal of Formal 
Educational Requirement for Admission to the Bar, 44 A.L.R.4th 910, § 2 
(1986). 
222. See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: 
Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and 
Devaluation of Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal 
Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105 (2010). 
223. See, e.g., STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL 
READER (2007). 
224. Cf. Richard Brust, The High Bench vs. the Ivory Tower, A.B.A. J., 
Feb. 1, 2012, at 50, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_high_bench_vs._the_ivory_t
ower/ (discussing the use of legal scholarship). 
225. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 7 & n.20 (collecting authorities). 
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Although ELS, NLR, and the “Law ands”226 share a 
synergistic relationship with EBP, the point of EBP is “not to 
produce a set of empirical term papers that we academics can 
present to each other at conferences. The point is to create 
better law—law informed by reality.”227 As Maurice Rosenberg 
commented, EBP research is not as obsessed with revisionist 
originality as traditional academic research “and is willing to 
work three years without necessarily turning up a tremendous 
new discovery, but just adding one more brick to the edifice of 
knowledge.”228 In response, empirical academics might warn 
would-be evidence-based policymakers of the “pull of the policy 
audience,”229 where hyper-focus on current policy relevance can 
subtly yet dangerously cloud research objectivity.230 This is not 
to say that pure research is not useful. It clearly is. By virtue of 
academic freedom, there must always be pure research.231 But, 
EBP unapologetically seeks to apply research to real-world 
problems. 
Fortunately for EBP, academic empiricists can provide not 
only another rich (and perhaps more independent) source of 
relevant empirical research but also a check on the FJC, 
RAND,232 and other more explicitly policy-focused 
institutions.233 Whether to produce academic term papers or 
 
226. See Marc Galanter & Mark Alan Edwards, Introduction: The Path 
of the Law Ands, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 375, 376. 
227. Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 910. 
228. Schwarzer, supra note 50, at 1159 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
229. Suchman & Mertz, supra note 204, at 575 (quoting Austin Sarat & 
Susan Sibley, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 L. & POL’Y 97, 97 (1988)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
230. Id. at 575-76. 
231. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 50, at 1158. 
232. The RAND Institute for Civil Justice has conducted considerable 
private and government-funded empirical research of the federal courts. For 
example, Congress and the AOUSC commissioned RAND to evaluate the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. See JAMES KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, 
AND INEXPENSIVE?: AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996). 
233. For example, consider the recent academic critique of the FJC’s 
Twombly/Iqbal pleading study. Compare Cecil et al., supra note 199, and 
Hoffman, supra note 198. There is an all-your-eggs-in-one-basket “danger of 
an over-reliance on a single government-controlled source of research 
evidence.” Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice 
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reality-based policy, all empirical research shares a basic 
common methodology. In the civil litigation arena, such 
methodology includes the challenge of coding cases to make 
them empirically useful. 
 
III. The Challenge of Case Coding 
 
Mark Twain may have quipped: “Facts are stubborn 
things, but statistics are more pliable.”234 For EBP to work, it 
must have access to relevant, representative, and reliable 
empirical data.235 Because empirical research—like all 
research—can be manipulated,236 policymakers need to be good 
consumers of empirical research.237 The representativeness and 
reliability of EBP depends upon the quality of the input 
evidence. Garbage in, garbage out.238 To be useful for EBP, an 
empirical study thus must utilize a rigorous, sound research 
methodology. 
Generally, the methodology for all empirical research has 
four steps: (1) design the empirical project; (2) collect and code 
data; (3) analyze the data; and (4) present the final results.239 
This Part focuses upon the second step, data coding. All raw 
data—from a pile of pleadings to electronic docket entries in a 
court database—need to be analyzed and labeled before they 
 
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 8. Insider policy 
researchers might suffer from a myopic “preoccupation with research geared 
simply to fulfilling established and unquestioned policy objectives.” Francis 
Terry, Transport: Beyond Predict and Provide, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 
18, at 200. The more an academic researcher becomes a government insider, 
the greater the “pull of the policy audience” to compromise objectivity. See 
supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
234. AYRES, supra note 34, at 79 (quoted with no citation). 
235. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
236. See, e.g., JOEL BEST, STAT-SPOTTING: A FIELD GUIDE TO INDENTIFYING 
DUBIOUS DATA (2008); HANS ZEISEL & DAVID KAYE, PROVE IT WITH FIGURES: 
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW AND LITIGATION (1997); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, 
Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using Empirical Research in Law 
and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777 (2002). 
237. Accord LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 1. 
238. See supra notes 37-40, 88-90 and accompanying text. 
239. Epstein & Martin, Quantitative Approaches, supra note 30, at 904. 
There are of course other formulations of these steps but they all share the 
same basic substance. See, e.g., LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 395-96. 
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can be useful. Whether qualitative,240 quantitative,241 
experimental,242 or multi-method,243 all empirical research 
must code raw data into standardized variables that can be 
analyzed.244 
Although the best empirical design begins with a research 
question to guide data collection,245 in light of the expense of 
collecting and coding data, “so-called ‘multi-user’ datasets, 
designed for a wide-range of problems,”246 are worthy empirical 
projects. Using such multi-user datasets is often called 
“archival research,” because it “involves the use of data that 
have been stored (or archived) in some form,”247 or “secondary 
data-analysis,” because someone else initially collected and 
coded the primary data.248 
Such datasets, however, “are like the apple in the Garden 
of Eden: tempting but full of danger.”249 Although multi-user 
datasets “constitute a rich lode of materials on which many 
substantial analyses can be performed,”250 they “cannot be 
plucked mechanically from their source and entered into an 
analysis. Without exception, all published statistics should be 
treated with suspicion.”251 The key to using a preexisting, 
publicly available dataset is ensuring that it provides the 
correct data necessary to answer one’s research question. One’s 
 
240. See BRYMAN, supra note 23, at 19-20. 
241. Id. 
242. See generally BORUCH, supra note 30. 
243. “Multi-method” empirical research “uses more than one research 
technique or strategy to study one or several closely related phenomena.” 
Laura Beth Nielsen, The Need for Multi-Method Approaches in Empirical 
Legal Research in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 953 
(Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzer, eds. 2010). For example, the Civil Litigation 
Research Project (“CLRP”) employed both qualitative and quantitative 
empirical research methods to explore “how many people used the [legal] 
system and why.” Id. at 956-57 (collecting authorities). 
244. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 166 (citing EARL R. BABBIE, THE 
PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 325 (11th ed. 2006)); Epstein & Martin, 
Coding Variables, supra note 5, at 321. 
245. Epstein & Martin, Quantitative Approaches, supra note 30, at 905. 
246. Id. at 909. 
247. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 125. 
248. Id. at 128-29. 
249. HERBERT JACOB, USING PUBLISHED DATA 9 (1984). 
250. Id. at 50. 
251. Id. at 50-51. 
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research question should always drive the dataset and not vice 
versa.252 
Consequently, a multi-user dataset may suffer from two 
research shortcomings. First, it may have selective deposit, 
where it lacks “data on all of the variables in which the 
researcher might be interested and that might influence the 
relationships under investigation.”253 Second, its data might 
suffer from selective survival, where either “not all possible 
data were recorded” or “decisions about the maintenance of the 
data may mean that some data are retained and other data 
discarded.”254 When evaluating a multi-user dataset for EBP, a 
researcher thus must ask: “Who collected it and for what 
purpose? What procedures were used for collecting the data? 
How were variables defined? What categories or classifications 
were used? At what level of aggregation were the data 
collected? . . . What documentation is available?”255 
There are many examples of such multi-user datasets in 
the federal government256 and the academy.257 Such public 
 
252. For example, Brian Leiter has criticized too much ELS work as 
 
[D]riven by the existence of a data set, rather than an 
intellectual or analytical point. But the existence of a data 
set then permits a display of technical skills, which is 
satisfying to those with a technical fetish. But for everyone 
else, the question remains: why does this matter? why 
should one care? and so on. 
 
Brian Leiter, On So Called “Empirical Legal Studies” and Its Problems, 
BRIAN LEITER’S L. SCH. REP. (July 6, 2010), 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2010/07/on-socalled-empirical-legal-
studies.html. 
253. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 126-27. 
254. Id. at 127. 
255. Id. at 131. 
256. The best starting point for U.S. federal statistics is the Statistical 
Abstract of the United States. What is the Statistical Abstract?, UNITED 
STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ (last 
visited Dec. 21, 2012). 
257. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court Database (often called 
“Spaeth’s Database” after the principal investigator) has “not just helped fill 
gaps in our knowledge. It is one of those rare creatures in the law and social 
science world: an invention that has substantially advanced a large area of 
study, inspiring research by scholars hailing from no fewer than three and as 
many as seven disciplines.” The Genesis of the Database, THE SUPREME COURT 
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data-sharing has many benefits, which include: (1) reinforcing 
“open scientific inquiry” that allows subsequent studies on the 
same data to correct any errors in previous studies; (2) 
encouraging a “diversity of analysis and opinions” where 
“[r]esearchers having access to the same data can challenge 
each other’s analyses and conclusions”; (3) promoting new 
research and allowing for the testing of new or alternative 
methods, even using the data “in ways that the original 
investigators had not envisioned”; (4) improving data collection 
and measurement methods through peer review; (5) promoting 
methodological consensus over publicly available data; and (6) 
“[r]educ[ing] costs by avoiding duplicate data collection 
efforts.”258 
Because this Article’s thesis is to create a new multi-user 
dataset of federal court outcomes,259 the more cases that can be 
coded and added to the dataset the better for two reasons. 
 
DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/about.php (last visited Dec. 21, 
2012). A similar database exists for the U.S. Court of Appeals. U.S. Appeals 
Courts Database, THE JUDICIAL RESEARCH INITIATIVE, 
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2012) (often 
called the “Songer Database”). 
There are many more academic multi-user datasets available. Two 
comprehensive portals to multiple publicly available datasets are maintained 
by ICPSR and IQSS. The University of Michigan Inter-University 
Consortium For Political and Social Research (“ICPSR”) “maintains a data 
archive of more than 500,000 files of research in the social sciences.” About 
ICPSR, ICPSR, 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/membership/about.html (last 
visited Dec. 21, 2012). The Harvard University Institute for Quantitative 
Social Science (“IQSS”) Dataverse Network “is an open source application to 
publish, share, reference, extract and analyze research data. It facilitates 
making data available to others, and allows to replicate others work.” About 
the Project, THE DATAVERSE NETWORK PROJECT, http://thedata.org/book/about-
project (last visited Dec. 21, 2012). The actual Network is located at 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/. 
258. INTERUNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, GUIDE TO 
SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA PREPARATION AND ARCHIVING: BEST PRACTICE 
THROUGHOUT THE DATA LIFE CYCLE V (3rd ed. 2005) (citing Stephen Feinberg, 
Sharing Statistical Data in the Biomedical and Health Sciences: Ethical, 
Institutional, Legal, and Professional Dimensions, 15 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 
1 (1994)), available at, 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/61289/1/ICPSR_dataprep_pd
f (last visited Dec. 21, 2012). 
259. For further discussion of outcome-based research, see infra notes 
367-73 and accompanying text. 
43
RHEE Final 2/28/2013 9:47 PM 
2013] EVIDENCE-BASED FED. CIVIL RULEMAKING 103 
First, “as a general rule, researchers should collect as much 
data as resources and time allow because basing inferences on 
more data rather than less is almost always preferable.”260 
Second, because a multi-user dataset is intended for multiple 
users and is not custom-tailored to a specific research 
question,261 the more data, the less the likelihood of selective 
deposit262 or selective survival.263 
This Part focuses upon coding CM/ECF outcomes into the 
Federal Courts CM/ECF Descriptive Dataset (“FCCEDD”). 
Although the CM/ECF system has revolutionized online access 
to the federal courts, the present system is not conducive to 
efficient empirical research. Specifically, coding CM/ECF cases 
currently is cumbersome and expensive. Contemporaneous 
coding promises to code many more cases at minimal cost. 
 
A. The Electronic Case Filing Revolution 
 
Given the prevalence of internet access among American 
lawyers,264 it is not surprising that the federal courts allow 
attorneys and pro se litigants265 to file and receive official 
documents in ongoing federal civil litigation online via the 
internet and electronic mail. Rule 5(d)(3) states that a federal 
court “may, by local rule, allow papers to be filed, signed, or 
verified by electronic means that are consistent with any 
 
260. Epstein & Martin, Quantitative Approaches, supra note 30, at 910. 
261. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
264. For example, virtually all American lawyers the ABA surveyed in 
2011 had access to the internet. See 1 AM. BAR ASS’N, 2011 LEGAL 
TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT xvi-xvii, 35 (2011). 
265. For a discussion of how pro se litigants have less access to the 
internet than lawyers, see, for example, Donald E. Shelton, All Aboard? 
Electric Filing, the Digital Divide, and Access to Courts, 40 JUDGES’ J., no. 3, 
2001 at 31. The AOUSC recently admitted that very few pro se litigants use 
CM/ECF. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2012 
UPDATE 5 (2011) [hereinafter AOUSC, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/2012ITLongRa
ngePlan.pdf. 
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technical standards established by the [JCUS].”266 The JCUS 
established those technical standards in its CM/ECF project.267 
CM/ECF has “revolutionized the way in which the federal 
courts manage their cases and documents. This easy-to-use 
system allows attorneys to file documents directly with the 
court over the [i]nternet and allows courts to file, store, and 
manage their case files in an easy-to-access, transparent 
way.”268 
Today, CM/ECF contains the filed documents for forty-one 
million federal cases.269 More than 600,000 federal court 
attorneys and pro se litigants have filed documents in 
CM/ECF.270 Most federal bankruptcy courts, district courts, 
and appellate courts operate CM/ECF via their respective court 
webpages.271 The CM/ECF project began in 1989 as the Public 
Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) program.272 
PACER has 1.2 million registered users273 who can access court 
documents and information online but cannot file or respond to 
lawsuits. In response to the evolution of PACER into an online 
electronic case docket, in 1998 the AOUSC began developing 
 
266. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3). 
267. About CM/ECF, ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. CTS., 
www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/CMECF/AboutCMECF.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2012) [hereinafter About CM/ECF]. 
268. Id. 
269. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF: 
ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS GROUP FINAL REPORT 1 (2012) 
[hereinafter AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF]. 
270. Id. 
271. For a current list of federal district courts utilizing the CM/ECF 
system, see Courts Accepting Electronic Filings, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/CMECF/Courts.aspx (last visited Dec. 
22, 2012). 
272. See Chronology of the Federal Judiciary’s Electronic Public Access 
(“EPA”) Program, PUB. ACCESS CT. ELECTRONIC RECS., 
http://www.pacer.gov/documents/epachron.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2012). 
The terms PACER and CM/ECF are used almost interchangeably. 
Technically, a non-lawyer can access PACER to obtain copies of federal civil 
litigation documents without interacting with CM/ECF whereas only lawyers 
or pro se litigants can access CM/ECF to file and receive litigation filings. See 
CM/ECF Registration, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR THE DISTRICT OF N.M., 
http://www.nmcourt.fed.us/web/DCDOCS/cmecf/registration.html (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2012). 
273. AOUSC, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra 
note 265, at 2. 
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CM/ECF.274 In 2006, Rule 5(d)(3) was amended so that a “local 
rule may require electronic filing only if reasonable exceptions 
are allowed.”275 However, Rule 5(d)(3) “does not define the 
scope of those exceptions.”276 The amendment “acknowledge[d] 
that many courts have required electronic filing by means of a 
standing order, procedures manual, or local rule.”277 Most 
federal courts require that attorneys initially register to use 
CM/ECF to submit and receive filings in any federal civil case 
and that once initially registered, attorneys must continue to 
use CM/ECF in all subsequent cases in front of that particular 
court.278 Rule 5.2 requires electronic filers to redact confidential 
personal information from electronically filed documents.279 
Although functionally CM/ECF is just an online electronic 
version of the traditional paper and “snail mail” filing system it 
replaced,280 what makes electronic case filing revolutionary is 
not only its increased convenience and broader public access,281 
but also its potential for empirical research. The AOUSC 
recognizes that “information technology presents opportunities 
not simply to replicate old paper processes in digital form but 
to rethink many aspects of those processes altogether.”282 In 
general, recent innovations in information access, information 
management, and data storage have provided the technological 
 
274. Chronology of the Federal Judiciary’s Electronic Public Access 
(“EPA”) Program, supra note 272. 
275. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3). 
276. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3) advisory committee’s note (2006 
Amendment). 
277. Id. 
278. 1 MARY SQUIERS, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 5.04(2)(c)(i) 
(2012). 
279. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a); see also About CM/ECF, supra note 267. 
280. See Looking for the Next Generation of the CM/ECF System, ADMIN. 
OFF. U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/09-05-
01/Looking_for_the_Next_Generation_of_the_CM_ECF_System.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Looking for the Next Generation of the 
CM/ECF System]. Indeed, Rule 5(d)(3) recognizes that a “paper filed 
electronically in compliance with a local rule is a written paper for purposes 
of these rules.” FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3). 
281. See generally PUB. ACCESS COURT ELEC. RECORDS, PACER USER 
MANUAL FOR ECF COURTS 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.pacer.gov/documents/pacermanual.pdf. 
282. AOUSC, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra 
note 265, at 1. 
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capability necessary for data-driven decision making.283 
Specifically, the CM/ECF web interface is menu-driven and 
requires electronic filers to code variables284 with basic 
information about the court filing before it is submitted 
online.285 The filer is required to label the uploaded electronic 
files containing the Adobe portable document format (“PDF”) 
images286 of the paper court documents with values for simple 
variables.287 This way an original source document is directly 
associated with its coded values. 
For example, if a registered plaintiff’s attorney wants to 
file a motion for a preliminary injunction,288 she must code the 
PDFs of the paper motion, memorandum in support, certificate 
of service, and other attachments289 contemporaneously with 
electronic filing.290 The filing then is coded by the type of case 
 
283. See AYRES, supra note 34, at 154-55; Huw Davies et al., Introducing 
Evidence-Based Policy and Practice in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, 
supra note 18, at 2. 
284. Accord LoPucki, supra note 16, at 484; see also supra notes 3 and 
235 and accompanying text. 
285. See CM/ECF Attorney’s User Guide Chapter 7, U.S. DISTRICT CT. 
FOR THE N. DISTRICT OF FLA., 
http://www.flnd.uscourts.gov/attorneys/cmecf/User_Manual/Ch7_Filing_Docs
_in_CV_Cases.pdf (last updated July 13, 2009). 
286. About CM/ECF, supra note 267. 
287. Current variables include 
 
[a] listing of all parties and participants including judges, 
attorneys and trustees[;] [a] compilation of case related 
information such as cause of action, nature of suit and 
dollar demand[;] [a] chronology of dates of case events 
entered in the case record[;] [a] claims registry[;] [a] listing 
of new cases each day in all courts[; and] [j]udgments or 
case status. 
 
Frequently Asked Questions, PUB. ACCESS CT. ELECTRONIC RECS., 
http://www.pacer.gov/psc/faq.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2012) (click “PACER” 
tab; then click “Case Related” tab; then click “What information is available 
on PACER?”). 
288. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a). 
289. CM/ECF Attorney’s User’s Guide Chapter 7, supra note 285, at 2-10 
(explaining how to code a motion for preliminary injunction). 
290. A CM/ECF electronic filing is considered filed at the time listed in 
the Notice of Electronic Filing (“NEF”) automatically generated and e-mailed 
to the filer’s registered e-mail address once CM/ECF receives the filing. Id. at 
19. 
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(civil), type of document to be filed (motion), motion type 
(preliminary injunction), case number, party/parties filing the 
document, filing attorney, and name(s) of attachment(s).291 
Although currently the required information is rather 
basic—generally the information included in a standard case 
docket sheet—the coding is completed by the certifying 
attorney of record responsible for the court filing under Rule 
11(a).292 Under Rule 11, the filing attorney thus certifies the 
accuracy of her coding under penalty of sanctions.293 CM/ECF 
automatically electronically mails the filing—and associated 
coding—to the court, the clerk, and all other counsel of record, 
including opposing counsel.294 
Accordingly, three unique facts increase the likelihood of 
CM/ECF’s coding accuracy. First, the filing is coded 
contemporaneously with the formal submission of the filing 
when the coder’s knowledge of the filing is the clearest. Second, 
the coder is the attorney or pro se party with firsthand 
knowledge of the filing. Finally, the coding is reviewed by both 
opposing counsel and the court under penalty of Rule 11 
sanctions. 
At present, the AOUSC and the FJC295 are designing the 
“Next Generation of CM/ECF.”296 In 2008, the AOUSC 
appointed a steering group for the CM/ECF Next Generation 
(“Next Generation”) Project “to develop and prioritize system 
 
291. Id. at 2-10. 
292. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a), (b). The registered attorney’s (or pro se 
litigant’s) CM/ECF username and password is needed to access the system 
serve as the registered filer’s signature. MICHAEL SMITH, O’CONNOR’S FEDERAL 
RULES: CIVIL TRIALS 21 (2012) (citing D. AZ. LOC. R. 5.5(g)); U.S. DIST. COURT 
FOR THE S. DIST. OF CAL., ELECTRONIC CASE FILING ADMINISTRATION POLICIES & 
PROCEDURES MANUAL 11 (2012), available at 
http://www.casd.uscourts.gov/cmecf/pdf/CASDPolicies.pdf. 
293. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a), (b). 
294. CM/ECF Attorney’s User’s Guide Chapter 7, supra note 285, at 19-
20. 
295. Although the FJC retains “evaluat[ion of] emerging technologies . . . 
for their application to future needs of the Judiciary[,]” the FJC transferred 
“all development, implementation, and evaluation of court automation 
systems and supporting technologies” to the AOUSC in 1990. Schwarzer, 
supra note 50, at 1145-46 (citing Memorandum to the Chief Justice (Jan. 29, 
1992) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center)). 
296. AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at 1. 
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requirements for a new application.”297 The question they seek 
to answer is: “If we could change CM/ECF in any way, what 
would we want the Next Generation system to look like?”298 In 
2009, the AOUSC also appointed an Additional Stakeholders 
Functional Requirements Group (the “ASFRG”) to canvass 
selected users of CM/ECF outside the federal judiciary.299 
Professor Ted Eisenberg, editor of the Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies,300 represented the Association of American Law 
Schools on the ASFRG.301 The ASFRG completed its final 
report on February 27, 2012.302 This requirements-phase 
appears complete and “will be followed by design, coding, 
testing, and implementation phases.”303 
To facilitate empirical research and EBP fully, the Next 
Generation system design should include the automated ability 
to: (1) search the full-text of all available CM/ECF information 
with keywords (to include docket coding and the text of filed 
documents); (2) download relevant CM/ECF documents 
automatically; (3) import data from downloaded documents 
automatically into computer software used for empirical 
analysis; and (4) update the data from previous CM/ECF 
searches automatically.304 
The first and second design features are interrelated. The 
ability to keyword search all CM/ECF information would allow 
researchers to identify which documents to download 
automatically. Internal CM/ECF court users apparently 
 
297. Id. 
298. Looking for the Next Generation of the CM/ECF System, supra note 
280 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
299. AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at i. 
300. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, WILEY ONLINE LIBR., 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1740-1461 (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2012). 
301. AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at 2. 
302. Id. at i. 
303. ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, 
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/annualreport_2011/Key_Studies_Projects_And_Prog
rams.aspx (last visited Dec. 22, 2012) (follow “Key Studies Projects and 
Programs” hyperlink; then follow “Case Management/Electronic Case Files” 
hyperlink). 
304. See LoPucki, supra note 16, at 486-88. 
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already have this search capability.305 The ASFRG identified 
similar design features in its final report.306 So far, CM/ECF 
planners have hesitated to make this search capability publicly 
available for two reasons. First, they are concerned that such 
complex searches might negatively impact CM/ECF’s technical 
performance.307 Second, because the general public then would 
be able to search for all information under a particular judge’s 
name, they believe that this capability might violate the long-
standing JCUS policy of not releasing judge-specific 
information.308 
The third design feature would require all CM/ECF filers 
to upload their documents to CM/ECF in an automatically 
importable electronic format. Such an automatically importable 
format has been the subject of an ongoing software trial in the 
federal bankruptcy courts. Since 2005, the federal bankruptcy 
courts have mandated the use of data-enabled “fillable” PDF 
bankruptcy forms in most electronically filed bankruptcy 
cases.309 “Users of these forms ‘code’ the data as they create it, 
by entering it into fields (boxes) in specified formats—
essentially the way customers fill out order forms on the 
[i]nternet.”310 These relational forms tag each entry “as the 
 
305. AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at 11-12. 
306. Id. at 18-19. 
307. Id. at 12. 
308. Id. at 12 n.8. This and other privacy concerns are examined below. 
This Article argues for a simple privacy standard where information that 
otherwise would be public should be publicly available on CM/ECF. See infra 
Part IV.A.4. 
The Judicial Conference’s policy is counter to public transparency and should 
be revoked. Because a judge’s name on an individual case docket sheet or 
opinion is already publicly available, it is nonsensical to limit the searching 
and aggregation of what otherwise would be public information. Judges have 
a great deal of power—to include literally the power of life and death—and 
should be held publicly accountable. The public should be able to find out how 
judges have ruled overall in a variety of different kinds of cases. Allowing this 
policy to stand makes the Judicial Conference look like an elitist, self-
promoting club and erodes public confidence in judicial integrity. 
309. Memorandum from Admin. Office of U.S. Courts to Bankr. Petition 
Preparation Software Cos., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 1 (Sept. 23, 2005), 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/defs/docs/smart_forms_ltr.pdf; see also 
LoPucki, supra note 16, at 484 & n.4. 
310. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 484. 
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value of a characteristic of an object.”311 Data management, 
spreadsheet, and statistical analysis programs then “can 
process” such coded empirical data “into statistics, tables, and 
graphs.”312 The ASFRG also identified this design feature in its 
final report.313 
Before CM/ECF, litigants were required to complete and 
attach standard paper court forms to their paper filings when 
manually submitting them to the court clerk.314 In a similar 
fashion, CM/ECF filers can be required either to attach a 
completed data-enabled fillable PDF form with the required 
coding to every electronic filing or to write all electronic filings 
solely on fillable PDF forms. 
Finally, the ability to update automatically the results 
from previous CM/ECF searches with cases added since the 
last search would allow rulemaking empirical studies to stay 
current at minimal cost. According to one CM/ECF empirical 
researcher, because of the problems with the current system, 
“only a handful” of CM/ECF empirical studies are presently 
updated.315 
Incorporating these design features into the Next 
Generation system could potentially transform EBP not only in 
the federal judiciary but also, by example, in the rest of the 
federal government. The current CM/ECF system, however, 
actually hinders EBP. 
 
B. Current CM/ECF Coding Is Cumbersome 
 
As one researcher commented, using the current CM/ECF 
system for empirical research is almost prohibitively resource-
 
311. Id. 
312. Id. 
313. See generally AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 
269, at 17-19. 
314. See Court Forms by Number, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/formsandfees/forms/courtforms.aspx#_UJcangqqEns.
pdfonline (last visited Dec. 23, 2012). For example, a completed Form JS 044: 
Civil Cover Sheet has been attached to every federal civil complaint since 
1974. See, e.g., Civil Cover Sheet, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FormsAndFees/Forms/JS044.pdf 
[hereinafter AOUSC, Civil Cover Sheet]. 
315. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 486-87. 
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intensive.316 Although hundreds if not thousands of researchers 
use CM/ECF data,317 they are unable to download usable data 
directly from CM/ECF.318 Because CM/ECF’s current search 
capabilities are extremely limited,319 researchers often must 
identify relevant cases from separate sources, independent of 
CM/ECF.320 Although CM/ECF documents are PDFs,321 they 
are not required to have renderable (and thus searchable) 
text.322 Often the PDFs are merely scanned images of 
insufficient quality to be converted to text through optical 
character recognition software.323 
As a result, researchers typically print out hard copies of 
relevant documents in every CM/ECF case and then have 
human coders manually code them.324 This Article shall call the 
current method of coding CM/ECF cases using human manual 
coders simply “current coding” and the contemporaneous 
coding of CM/ECF cases as mandated by the proposed Model 
Rule and as implemented in the FCCEDD325 simply 
“contemporaneous coding.” Under current coding, training, 
hiring, and cross-checking manual coders can be quite time-
consuming and expensive.326 By minimizing the need for 
manual coding, contemporaneous coding can improve the 
quality of federal court empirical data. 
 
 
316. See Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District 
Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973, 987 (2008). 
317. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 486. 
318. See id. at 486-87. 
319. See AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at 11. 
320. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 486. There are searchable, albeit limited, 
aftermarket CM/ECF databases available. See, e.g., Jennifer Behrens, 
Research Guides: Court Records and Briefs, J. MICHAEL GOODSON LAW 
LIBRARY AT DUKE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 
http://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/lib/recordsbriefs.pdf (last updated July 
2012). 
321. About CM/ECF, supra note 267. 
322. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 486-87. 
323. Id. 
324. Id. at 484. 
325. For further discussion, see supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text. 
326. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis 
of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 110 n.192, 111 (2008) (collecting 
authorities). 
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3
RHEE Final 2/28/2013 9:47 PM 
112 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
C. Contemporaneous Coding Can Code More Data at a Lower
 Cost 
 
The advantage of contemporaneous coding over current 
coding is not in accuracy but rather in economies of scale. 
Contemporaneous coding can code many more CM/ECF cases 
at a much lower cost than current coding. 
As explained above, the primary difference between 
current coding and contemporaneous coding is that current 
coding is done retroactively by an uninvolved party327 whereas 
contemporaneous coding is done prospectively by an involved 
party.328 The current coding of CM/ECF cases requires hiring 
human coders to code every document in each case manually.329 
Because the coder is unfamiliar with the case, she must take 
time to read over each document she is reviewing to ensure 
that the proper variables and values are coded. This reviewing 
time means that she would code this document much slower 
than someone who was already familiar with the particular 
document and the underlying lawsuit. To guide manual coders, 
researchers must also develop coding schema, “a detailing of 
each variable of interest, along with the values of each 
variable,”330 and carefully document such schema in codebooks, 
“guides they employ to code their data and that others can use 
to replicate, reproduce, update, or build on the variables the 
resulting database contains and any analyses generated from 
it.”331 To double check the coding’s accuracy, another coder 
must re-code a random sample of the same documents to 
confirm that both coders applied the coding schema the same 
way.332 It is easy to see how current coding can be costly and 
yet only code a small fraction of the available documents and 
cases on CM/ECF.333 
 
 
327. See supra Part III.B. 
328. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. 
329. See generally Hall & Wright, supra note 326, at 109-11, 110 n.192. 
330. Epstein & Martin, Quantitative Approaches, supra note 30, at 911. 
331. Id. 
332. MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 30, at 67; see Hall & Wright, supra 
note 326, at 113. 
333. See Hall & Wright, supra note 326, at 110 & n.192, 111. 
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In contrast, contemporaneous coding should be 
inexpensive—if not free—and code all available CM/ECF cases 
and documents filed after the Model Rule’s adoption. Because 
the Model Rule and its implementation in the next generation 
of CM/ECF would make contemporaneous coding a required 
step in the electronic filing process, manual human coders 
would be needed only to double check a random sample of the 
relevant dataset.334 Furthermore, because the underlying case 
documents are associated with the relevant contemporaneous 
coding,335 manual human coders can easily access the 
documents associated with a coding sample and re-code them. 
Even though the adversarial process should ensure coding 
accuracy, researchers nevertheless always should double check 
a random sample. 
This Article recommends contemporaneous coding not for 
its own sake, but rather so that the resulting descriptive 
empirical dataset can provide a shared baseline for policy 
debate.336 Because this dataset must be indisputably objective 
for all sides in a policy debate to accept it, contemporaneous 
coding is limited to case-related outcomes.337 Case-related 
outcomes are easily verifiable facts about the personal 
characteristics, proffered arguments, and litigation results in a 
particular case.338 They are facts over which the parties, the 
court clerk, and the presiding judge in a particular case would 
agree. Although there is often disagreement over an 
argument’s legal merit, there should be agreement over a 
description of the argument’s reasoning.339 Although coders 
normally should not have a personal stake in what they are 
coding,340 there is little risk of bias in the Model Rule. This is 
because contemporaneous coding is restricted to factual 
 
334. Id. 
335. For further discussion, see supra notes 285-90. 
336. For further discussion, see supra Part I.B. 
337. See supra note 4. 
338. Id. 
339. If there is disagreement, then the remedy is a motion for a more 
definite statement. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). 
340. Epstein & Martin, Coding Variables, supra note 5, at 326; see also 
Richard A. Posner, Some Realism About Judges: A Reply to Edwards and 
Livermore, 59 DUKE L.J. 1177, 1181 (2010) (expressing skepticism over 
“judicial self-reporting . . . as a valid source of knowledge”). 
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outcomes vetted by the adversarial process. 
While these case-related outcomes might be available on 
the current CM/ECF, many of them have not been coded.341 For 
example, while the current CM/ECF might have a PDF of a 
motion for summary judgment available for download, current 
coding does not code any arguments in the motion. To obtain 
that information, a researcher currently must examine the 
PDF and code the arguments herself. In contrast, 
contemporaneous coding would have already coded the 
arguments in the motion in a downloadable format. This would 
alleviate the need to examine the PDF except to verify 
reliability. 
Both current coding and contemporaneous coding can code 
case-based outcomes with comparable reliability. Of the three 
“R” questions to guide the selection of evidence for EBP,342 the 
third “R”, reliability, concerns “how well-founded—
theoretically, empirically”343—is the evidence? Although the 
word “reliability” was employed to maintain the alliterative 
acronym, this reliability idea can be broken down further into 
two related concepts—statistical reliability and statistical 
validity.344 
First, contemporaneous coding should be at least as 
statistically reliable as current coding. Statistical reliability is 
“the extent to which it is possible to replicate a measurement, 
reproducing the same value (regardless of whether it is the 
right one) on the same standard for the same subject at the 
same time.”345 For example, a thermometer is statistically 
reliable if you can stick it your mouth one hundred times and 
get the same temperature reading. Although you do not know if 
the temperature reading is accurate, you do know that the 
thermometer is consistent. Because coding under either 
 
341. See supra note 286 and accompanying text. 
342. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
343. Solesbury, supra note 18, at 9. 
344. To avoid confusion, this Article uses the words “statistical 
reliability” to distinguish this concept from the broader “reliability” concept of 
the three R’s. See id. But the term “reliability” is usually used in empirical 
literature without the “statistical” modifier. See, e.g., LAWLESS ET AL., supra 
note 82, at 42. Likewise, the term “validity” is usually used in empirical 
literature without the “statistical” modifier. Id. at 36. 
345. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 83. 
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method is limited to case-related outcomes, both current coding 
and contemporaneous coding should be able to code such 
simple facts consistently. 
In fact, contemporaneous coding might arguably be more 
statistically reliable than current coding. With 
contemporaneous coding, the coders—the party counsel, court 
clerk, or presiding judge—not only have the most firsthand 
knowledge of the document which they are coding, but also 
have a special ethical and professional duty to code the 
document correctly.346 The formal authority of the proposed 
Model Rule, the adversarial process, the court’s scrutiny, the 
duty of candor under Rule 11, and the knowledge that the 
public can search the coding using a judge’s or counsel’s 
name347 should all help ensure contemporaneous coding’s 
statistical reliability. With current coding, the coders have 
neither firsthand knowledge of the document that they are 
coding nor a special ethical or professional duty to code the 
document correctly. 
Second, contemporaneous coding should be as statistically 
valid as current coding. Statistical validity is “the extent to 
which a reliable measure reflects the underlying concept being 
measured.”348 For example, a statistically reliable, but invalid, 
thermometer might consistently give you the wrong 
temperature, ten degrees lower than the actual temperature. 
In comparison, a statistically valid thermometer would give 
you the correct temperature. Again, in light of the factual 
simplicity of case-based outcomes, both current coding and 
contemporaneous coding should be able to be statistically valid. 
In fact, contemporaneous coding might be more 
statistically valid than current coding for legal outcomes 
because contemporaneous coders are generally legally trained 
whereas current coders need not be. There are complex 
questions of legal doctrine that attorneys or judges well versed 
in the relevant law might reliably code correctly, but non-
legally trained (or legal novice) manual coders might reliably 
 
346. See supra notes 291-93 and accompanying text. 
347. See infra Part IV.A.1-2. 
348. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 87. 
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code incorrectly.349 As Judge Harry Edwards observed, legal 
doctrine is difficult to translate “into data that are susceptible 
to mathematical analysis.”350 The close study of legal doctrine 
“‘is impossible with currently available or readily foreseeable 
empirical tools.’”351 This is a serious issue, because precedents 
“‘fix the point of departure from which the labor of the judge 
begins.’”352 
With current coding, “the overriding goal of a codebook—
and indeed the entire coding process—is to minimize the need 
for interpretation.”353 Consequently, current coding might avoid 
coding legal outcomes altogether even though they might 
nevertheless be factual, case-related outcomes.354 
In contrast, contemporaneous coding can leverage its 
coders’ insider legal expertise to code legal outcomes better. 
When coding legal outcomes, there is no substitute for legal 
training. Recall that case-related outcomes require consensus 
from all parties and the judge.355 Thus, only bright-line, well-
established legal outcomes can be coded. 
Even researchers trained in outsider “Law and” disciplines 
who never went to law school might make coding decisions with 
which lawyers might disagree.356 Without losing the necessary 
 
349. For an example of an empirical study that codes legal outcomes, see 
Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis 
of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 481-82 (2009). 
350. Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of 
Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate 
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1910 (2009). 
351. Id. at 1903 (quoting FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. 
COURTS OF APPEALS 202 (2007)). 
352. Id. at 1897 (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process 20 (Yale Univ. Press 22nd ed. 1964) (1921)). 
353. Epstein & Martin, Coding Variables, supra note 5, at 326. 
354. For example, Judge Edwards claims that the Songer U.S. Court of 
Appeals Database does not code the content of any opinions. Edwards & 
Livermore, supra note 350, at 1926. See generally U.S. Appeals Courts 
Database, supra note 257. 
355. See supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
356. As David Kennedy and William Fisher III explained: 
 
Scholars in [other fields] all refer to law, and each of these 
disciplines has its own—outsider’s—idea about what law is 
and how it works. The experience of lawyers and legal 
scholars reading the work of colleagues in other fields is 
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focus on outcomes, contemporaneous coding can help innovate 
more sophisticated empirical approaches to understanding 
legal doctrine and legal decision making by “mov[ing] beyond 
asking which litigant prevailed in a case and now also ask[ing] 
how the advocates and the court framed the question presented 
and how the legal analysis unfolded in the opinion.”357 Perhaps 
contemporaneous coding can even help develop a uniquely legal 
empirical methodology.358 
For example, school desegregation law is a complex, 
specialized area of legal doctrine.359 Although the distinction 
between de jure mandatory and de facto voluntary school 
segregation is elementary to anyone familiar with the law, it 
might be arcane to someone unfamiliar with the law. This 
simple distinction, however, is fundamental to school 
desegregation law because “[s]chool districts that had engaged 
in [de jure] segregation had an affirmative constitutional duty 
to desegregate; those that were [de facto] segregated did not.”360 
This is because only de jure segregation violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution.361 
 
 
 
often a frustrating one. “If only they had a better sense of 
how law worked from the inside,” we often think, or “if only 
they had gone to law school.” 
 
David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, Preface to THE CANON OF AMERICAN 
LEGAL THOUGHT, at ix (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, eds. 2006) 
(emphasis in original). 
357. Gregory Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative 
Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
873, 885 (2008) (reviewing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. 
COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)); see also Edwards & Livermore, supra note 350, at 
1927. 
358. Hall & Wright, supra note 326, at 63. 
359. Because new desegregation lawsuits are extremely rare, even most 
lawyers have little reason to know school desegregation law. Today, school 
desegregation law is primarily considered a historical legal doctrine whose 
relevance has largely passed. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The “We’ve Done 
Enough” Theory of School Desegregation, 39 HOW. L.J. 767 (1996). 
360. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 794 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
361. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
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Whether a court has ever found a school district to have 
engaged in de jure segregation is a case-based legal outcome. 
Under contemporaneous coding, the trial lawyers or presiding 
judge in a school desegregation case would be able to code that 
legal outcome with no trouble. Under current coding, however, 
an outsider coder unfamiliar with school desegregation law 
might have difficulty coding that legal outcome. If the law 
changes, then the coding scheme must be revised to reflect the 
change. 
Recall that the purpose of case coding is to create the 
FCCEDD, a new multi-user dataset of federal court outcomes. 
Because contemporaneous coding can code much more data 
than current coding, contemporaneous coding provides greater 
data on which to base inferences362 and is less likely than 
current coding to create a dataset that suffers from selective 
deposit363 or selective survival.364 
The comprehensive case outcome data produced through 
contemporaneous coding would be online, electronic, and 
searchable by computer. “Most case coding projects” since the 
early 1980’s “have taken advantage of the ability to select cases 
using structured computer searches . . . .”365 One of the 
FCCEDD’s potential scholarly contributions to the body of 
public electronic knowledge on the federal courts is the 
comprehensive coding of unpublished opinions.366 
 
IV. Contemporaneous Coding of Federal Court Cases 
 
The purpose of contemporaneous coding of cases in 
CM/ECF is to create the FCCEDD and thereby provide a 
descriptive baseline of objective empirical data for EBP.367 The 
 
362. For further discussion, see supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
363. For further discussion, see supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
364. For further discussion, see supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
365. Hall & Wright, supra note 326, at 106. 
366. In 2007, less than seventeen percent of all court of appeals opinions 
were published. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 350, at 1923 & n.69. The 
Songer Database of court of appeals opinions codes only published opinions. 
See id. at 1922-23. The decision whether to publish or not to publish an 
opinion is far from random. Id. at 1923. Contemporaneous coding can 
supplement the Songer Database with unpublished court of appeals opinions. 
367. For further discussion about the need for a descriptive empirical 
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only way to do this is by ensuring that the resulting data are 
acceptable to all sides in any rulemaking debate. For the 
FCCEDD to be effective the data cannot be oversimplified or 
subjective. The data’s reliability must be beyond question.368 
Accordingly, the data must (1) be limited to authentic 
outcomes369 about the coded cases; (2) be coded and collected in 
a uniform manner; and (3) balance workability with utility. 
First, authentic outcomes are facts that remain the same 
regardless of normative outlook.370 They are facts about the 
parties’ idiosyncratic characteristics or proffered arguments 
and the results of the lawsuit over which there would be no 
dispute from the parties or the assigned judge. 
For example, the fact that the defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss371 two of the plaintiff’s four causes of action would be 
an authentic outcome. It can be independently verified by 
examining the official case filings. Neither the plaintiff, nor the 
defendant, nor the court would disagree with that fact. Another 
outcome would be the fact that the court dismissed one cause of 
action but denied dismissing the other. Again, that outcome 
could be independently verified by consulting the case docket 
sheet372 and the court’s filed memorandum order.373 
In contrast, whether the defendant’s motion was well 
written or whether the court was correct in its ruling would not 
be an authentic outcome because such determinations are too 
subjective to garner universal agreement of its validity.374 Not 
everyone might agree with the criteria used to determine 
whether a motion is well written or whether a court’s ruling is 
justified based upon the language of the pleadings and prior 
precedent. As another example, many empirical studies of 
judicial decision making measure judicial ideology.375 Even 
 
baseline in EBP, see supra Part I.B. 
368. For further discussion about reliability, see supra Part I.B. 
369. See supra notes 4 and 257. 
370. Rhee, supra note 4, at 1326-27. 
371. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
372. See also Court Records, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/CourtRecords.aspx (last visited Dec. 26, 2012). 
373. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b)(1). 
374. See Rhee, supra note 4, at 1326-27. 
375. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 350, at 1903-04. Accord AYRES, 
supra note 34, at 181 (describing the conflict regarding the use of 
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though such ideological criteria might be represented as 
reliable measures clearly defined in a codebook,376 its statistical 
validity is questionable because they usually employ 
oversimplified assumptions to ensure reliability.377 
Second, to ensure the FCCEDD’s consistency, its data 
must be coded and collected uniformly. Rule 5(d)(3) currently 
allows electronic filing to be governed by local rule.378 While 
most local federal district and circuit court CM/ECF webpages 
appear substantially similar, they have implemented e-filing 
differently.379 Because jurisdictional coding differences would 
defeat the EBP purpose behind the data, only uniform national 
implementation of the next generation CM/ECF will 
accomplish the EBP purpose of contemporaneous case 
coding.380 Rule 5(d)(3) thus should be amended to read: 
 
Papers filed, signed, or verified by electronic 
means must be consistent with the uniform 
technical standards established by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States. Such standards 
must allow reasonable exceptions to electronic 
filing. A paper filed electronically is a written 
paper for the purposes of these rules. 
 
Finally, the FCCEDD’s coding scheme must balance 
workability with utility. Coding should be relatively easy to 
complete and should not add a meaningful research or 
completion burden to any filing. Ideally, the additional fillable 
PDF forms or online drop down menus381 used for CM/ECF 
 
scientifically based methods verses holistic methods of teaching). 
376. See Epstein & Martin, Coding Variables, supra note 5, at 321. 
377. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 350, at 1905-07. 
378. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
379. See AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at 6-
11. 
380. Recognizing the research utility of allowing some coding variance 
by judicial district or circuit, the proposed rule below makes public 
information coding uniform and mandatory but allows for regional 
experimentation with voluntary coding of nonpublic or specialized 
information. See infra Part IV.A. 
381. For further discussion of these two possible technical 
implementations of the next generation CM/ECF, see supra Introduction & 
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contemporaneous coding should ask for outcomes readily 
available to any filing counsel and not take more than a few 
minutes per filing. Furthermore, because many attorneys are 
already familiar with CM/ECF, it should not be difficult for 
them to learn how to code more variables. That being said, the 
Advisory Committee should privilege utility over workability. 
Even if practitioners consider the new coding requirements 
burdensome, they will comply because they want to file or 
contest lawsuits in federal court.382 
To get the ball rolling, this Article proposes an imperfect 
working draft Model Rule (along with a draft Advisory 
Committee Note) and a possible FCCEDD coding scheme for 
complaints and answers. With its characteristic calm, care, and 
comprehensiveness,383 the Advisory Committee can no doubt 
improve upon this proposal. To ensure the FCCEDD’s 
uniformity, contemporaneous case coding should be mandated 
 
Part III.A. 
382. Some practitioners invested in the status quo and adverse to 
change undoubtedly would oppose this proposal. Hopefully, they would 
recognize how a publicly-searchable FCCEDD would improve their tactical 
and strategic research of judges, opposing counsel, parties, and expert 
witnesses and potentially bring them additional business. See infra Part 
IV.A.4 for further discussion. Similar complaints of increased workload and 
general resistance to change were rejected when the federal courts first 
mandated electronic filing or when courts adopted “to video and audio 
recording, to microfilm and computer tape, and, in the more distant past, to 
novel indexing schemes like citation tables and legal citation indexes.” 
Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition 
to Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 773 
n.1 (2012) (citing Patti Ogden, “Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law”: A 
Story of Legal Citation Indexes, 85 LAW. LIBR. J. 1 (1993)). 
In the final analysis, technological or informational improvements in any 
area of government simply require the political will to force practitioners to 
comply with new requirements. If forced to comply, practitioners will fall in 
line with even seemingly ridiculous requirements because they are willing to 
pay to play. For example, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California requires courtesy copies of electronic filings mailed to the Judge’s 
chambers to be “blue-backed” with a blue backing paper. C.D. CAL. LOC. R. 5-
4.5, available at 
http://court.cacd.uscourts.gov/Cacd/LocRules.nsf/a224d2a6f8771599882567cc
005e9d79/68db23614f0a0a058825768d00763043?OpenDocument. While 
many practitioners might agree that this bizarre, anachronistic practice not 
only appears to defeat some of the benefits of e-filing but also is burdensome, 
they all comply because they must to file or to contest federal lawsuits in the 
Central District of California. 
383. See, e.g., Kravitz, supra note 45, at 216-18. 
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by a new Federal Rule. Likewise, to ensure the FCCEDD’s 
representativeness and reliability, the coding scheme should 
focus on authentic outcomes and should be developed through 
collaboration between academics, practitioners, and judges. 
 
A. A New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
 
After presenting the Model Rule and a draft Advisory 
Committee Note explaining the Model Rule, this section 
examines the two most common criticisms of the Model Rule—
concerns about cost and privacy. 
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1. The Proposed Model Rule 
 
Rule 1.1. Evidence-Based Rulemaking 
 
(a) Purpose. The success of these rules in implementing 
the goals of Rule 1 must be continually assessed with objective, 
transparent, and methodologically sound empirical evidence. In 
accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-75, the Supreme Court, the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, all committees or 
subcommittees on civil rules of practice and procedure, and the 
Federal Judicial Center are committed to ensuring that these 
rules as much as possible embody assumptions based upon 
demonstrable empirical evidence and factual reality. This rule 
does not apply to any reasonable exceptions to electronic filing 
in accordance with Rule 5(d)(3). 
 
(b) Case Coding. To provide empirical evidence with 
which to assess the rules’ success in implementing Rule 1, all 
electronically filed cases will be subject to mandatory and 
voluntary case coding questions. 
 
(1) Mandatory. The Judicial Conference of the United 
States will establish and maintain uniform technical 
standards for the mandatory coding of all electronically 
filed cases in the federal courts. A database of this 
mandatory coding called the Federal Courts CM/ECF 
Descriptive Dataset (“FCCEDD”) will be publicly available 
and searchable by registered electronic filer name. 
 
(A) No Opt Out. No federal court may opt out of this 
mandatory coding. 
 
(B) Publicly Available Information. In general, 
mandatory coding will be limited to information that is 
already publicly available. 
 
(C) Signed Nonbinding Representation to the Court. 
All registered electronic filers are required to answer all 
mandatory coding questions honestly before 
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electronically filing any pleading, written motion, or 
other paper. The Notice of Electronic Filing384 e-mailed 
to every registered user will contain the filing’s 
mandatory coding. 
 
(i) Ethical Duty of Candor. Such mandatory 
coding is considered to be a signed representation to 
the court and is thereby subject to all the applicable 
disclosure requirements in these rules. 
 
(ii) No Estoppel. Although case coding will 
neither bind the parties nor have precedential value, 
the court and all parties share a professional 
obligation, consistent with the goals of Rule 1.1(a), to 
ensure that all mandatory coding accurately reflects 
the factual reality of their lawsuit. 
 
(2) Voluntary. A court may, by local rule or 
administrative order, add voluntary coding questions to 
the uniform mandatory coding questions. Such voluntary 
coding must be consistent with any technical standards 
established by the Judicial Conference of the United States 
and will apply only to cases electronically filed in that 
particular court. Subject to the collecting court’s conditions 
or limitations, this voluntary coding will be publicly 
available in the FCCEDD. 
 
(A) Flexible Purpose. The purpose of voluntary 
coding is to provide a court with the discretion to 
conduct local experiments and to collect additional 
empirical evidence to evaluate the rules. To provide the 
court with accurate, useful research, all electronically 
filing parties are encouraged—but not required—to 
answer voluntary coding questions with the same 
candor as a signed representation to the court. 
 
 
 
384. See supra text accompanying note 289. 
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(B) Can Include Non-Public Information. Voluntary 
coding can collect non-public information. The court will 
make every effort to safeguard such nonpublic 
information. Unless a court order or local rule or 
procedure mandates otherwise, the Notice of Electronic 
Filing e-mailed to every registered user will not contain 
the filing’s voluntary coding. 
 
(C) Limited Waiver of Privileged Non-Public 
Information. If a court inadvertently discloses nonpublic 
information collected through voluntary coding, the 
privilege protections of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) 
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) will 
apply with the filing party acting as the holder of the 
privilege. 
 
(c) Correction Procedure. There is a formal correction 
procedure only for mandatory coding. 
 
(1) Mandatory Coding. Technical accuracy in 
mandatory coding should be enforced with the same level 
of care and professionalism as with any other rule. 
Opposing counsel, the court, and the court clerk should 
scrutinize mandatory coding with the same attention to 
detail given to the underlying filed document. 
 
(A) If a Party’s Coding Is in Error. If a party has 
erroneously coded its filed document, the opposing party 
must first attempt to meet and confer with the filing 
party to persuade it to amend its coding before 
submitting a motion to correct mandatory case coding. 
 
(i) Meet and Confer Requirement. If opposing 
counsel believes that a filing party’s mandatory 
coding does not accurately reflect the underlying 
filed document, opposing counsel should first 
attempt informally to meet and confer with the filing 
party in a manner similar to Rule 37(a)(1). 
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(ii) Motion to Correct Mandatory Case Coding. If 
the filing party refuses to amend its mandatory 
coding, opposing counsel should then file a motion to 
correct mandatory case coding with the court 
concisely detailing the disparity between the 
mandatory coding and the underlying filed 
document and include a certification that the 
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to 
confer with the filing party to correct the erroneous 
mandatory coding without court action. 
 
(B) If the Court’s Coding Is in Error. If a party 
believes that the court’s mandatory coding does not 
accurately reflect the underlying order of the court, then 
the party should file a motion to correct mandatory case 
coding with the court summarizing the error and 
specifying the requested correction. 
 
(C) Original Filing Court Final Arbiter of Motion. 
The court where the disputed mandatory coding was 
originally filed will be the final arbiter of a motion to 
correct mandatory case coding. Although a court must 
enter an order into the record explaining its reasons for 
granting or denying the motion, such an order itself is 
non-appealable. It is, however, part of the record and as 
such can be used as evidence of error in a subsequent 
appeal. This arrangement should balance the need to 
ensure coding accuracy with a desire to avoid 
unnecessary satellite litigation. 
 
(2) Voluntary Coding. Because Rule 1.1(b)(2)(A) states 
that voluntary coding is not required, there is no formal 
correction procedure. 
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2. Proposed Advisory Committee Note385 
 
Rule 1.1 implements recommendations first made in a 
1995 Self-Study commissioned by the Rules Standing 
Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See 
Daniel R. Coquillette, A Self-Study of Federal Judicial 
Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range 
Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and 
Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 168 
F.R.D. 679 (1995) (Report prepared by Thomas E. Baker and 
Frank H. Easterbrook). Specifically, the Self-Study’s 
Recommendation 6 stated, “Each Advisory Committee should 
ground its proposals on available data and develop mechanisms 
for gathering and evaluating data that are not otherwise 
available, and should use these data to decide whether changes 
in existing rules should be proposed.” Id. at 699. 
Evidence-based rulemaking seeks to make this 
recommendation a reality. Evidence-based rulemaking is a 
subset of so-called evidence-based policymaking, perhaps more 
accurately (but less pithily) labeled “evidence-informed 
policymaking or research-shaped decision making.” KAREN 
BOGENSCHNEIDER & THOMAS J. CORBETT, EVIDENCE-BASED 
POLICYMAKING: INSIGHTS FROM POLICY-MINDED RESEARCHERS 
AND RESEARCH-MINDED POLICYMAKERS 4 (2010). Evidence-
based rulemaking assumes that there is a set of research 
methods that serious “scholars agree constitutes a proper way 
for helping us distinguish fact from belief” and “that a body of 
sound knowledge can be developed to help address even the 
most contentious of social policy issues” including federal civil 
rulemaking. Id. 
Specifically, the Rule leverages the federal courts’ case 
management/electronic case filing (“CM/ECF”) system to create 
comprehensive, reliable, and inexpensive empirical data in a 
national Federal Courts CM/ECF Descriptive Dataset 
(“FCCEDD”—pronounced “fuh-said” for short). Starting from 
the date of the Rule’s adoption onward, Rule 1.1(b)(1) requires 
all parties, the court clerk, and the presiding judge to answer 
 
385. Consistent with Advisory Committee formatting guidelines, all 
citations in this draft Note are in the text. 
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uniform mandatory coding questions before filing any pleading, 
motion, order, or other paper in the CM/ECF system. This 
coding should provide objective, transparent, and 
methodologically sound empirical data for the FCCEDD. In 
turn, the FCCEDD should provide an objective factual baseline 
with which to evaluate past and future rulemaking. 
The only way such mandatory coding can provide an 
objective factual baseline is if it accurately reflects the factual 
reality in every electronically filed case. Because mandatory 
case coding is derivative of the underlying filed documents, 
there is no need to treat mandatory case coding independent of 
its underlying filed documents. Rule 1.1(b)(1)(C) thus 
recognizes that case coding, unlike the actual language of filed 
documents, lacks independent legal authority. Case coding is 
analogous to the Reporter of Decisions’s syllabi to Supreme 
Court opinions. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber 
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906). 
Notwithstanding mandatory coding’s lack of binding legal 
authority, the federal courts and the Bar must cultivate a 
culture of coding compliance among judges, judges’ law clerks, 
court staff, counsel, and counsel’s staff to effectuate the goals of 
Rule 1.1(a). Although as recognized in Rule 1.1(b)(1)(C)(ii) a 
party may not be estopped by its own mandatory coding, that 
party is still subject to ethical and professional discipline to 
include Rule 11 sanctions. 
The Administrative Office of United States Courts will 
maintain the FCCEDD. Ideally, the FCCEDD should be 
available to the public online, possess an easy-to-use user 
interface that allows for keyword and full-text searching (to 
include automatically updating prior searches with additional 
search results added since the last search), and allow the 
download of information automatically into electronic formats 
compatible with popular statistical analysis programs. 
It is in everyone’s self-interest to ensure accurate coding 
because not only shall the coding provide the raw data for this 
powerful, searchable, public database, but also as a result such 
coding will impact professional reputations of the judges, 
lawyers, and pro se counsel in the case. The general public—
not to mention judges, lawyers, and potential clients—will be 
able to search the FCCEDD by name on the internet and 
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receive as search results the aggregated coding in all 
electronically filed lawsuits where the searched name was a 
registered CM/ECF filer. 
Making all registered filers in a particular electronically 
filed case publicly responsible for the accuracy of mandatory 
coding and limiting Rule 1.1(c)’s correction procedure only to 
mandatory coding attempts to balance ensuring mandatory 
coding’s accuracy with avoiding unnecessary satellite litigation. 
To avoid unnecessary appeals over mandatory coding disputes, 
Rule 1.1(c)(1)(C) gives the court where the disputed mandatory 
coding was originally filed the final, unreviewable say on 
motions to correct mandatory case coding. 
For example, if the disputed mandatory coding was 
originally filed in federal district court, then the presiding 
federal district judge would be the final arbiter on a motion to 
correct mandatory case coding. If the district court denies the 
motion, the movant cannot appeal based solely upon the denial 
but can refer to the district court’s order denying the motion as 
evidence to support an appeal on another issue. If the court of 
appeals agrees with the movant and reverses the district court, 
then the court of appeals can order as part of its relief the 
correction of the erroneous mandatory coding. 
If the disputed mandatory coding concerned an appellate 
brief filed in the court of appeals, then the assigned three-judge 
panel would be the final arbiter on a motion to correct 
mandatory case coding. If the circuit panel denies the motion, 
the movant cannot petition for a rehearing en banc or for a writ 
of certiorari based solely upon the denial but can refer to the 
panel’s order denying the motion as evidence to support a 
rehearing or appeal on another issue. If the en banc court of 
appeals or the Supreme Court agrees with the movant that the 
panel erred, then it can order as part of its relief the correction 
of the erroneous mandatory coding. 
Courts are encouraged to adopt standing orders or local 
rules and procedures to ensure coding accuracy. At a minimum, 
judges should formally inform all parties of the importance of 
accurate mandatory coding and how a party’s coding accuracy, 
like properly stating the holding of a case precedent in a brief, 
can make a lasting positive first impression on the court and 
opposing counsel. 
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In a complementary manner, Rule 1.1(b)(2) allows 
individual federal district courts, a court of appeals, or the U.S. 
Supreme Court to ask the electronic filers in their respective 
jurisdictions to answer additional questions voluntarily. 
Because of the range of possible voluntary questions, the 
collecting court has discretion to limit or restrict access to such 
voluntary coding but as a general rule should aspire to make 
voluntary coding publicly available in the FCCEDD. Depending 
on the nature of the voluntary coding, the court may need to 
remove identifying data or to disassociate the voluntary coding 
from its underlying documents before posting it on the 
FCCEDD. Ideally, voluntary coding questions will employ the 
same CM/ECF user interface as mandatory coding questions. 
To promote imaginative research, a court can be creative 
with its voluntary coding questions. Such voluntary questions 
can run the gamut from nonpublic outcome information, to 
surveys collected by the Federal Judicial Center or an academic 
researcher, to random experimentation. Rule 1.1(b)(2)(A)’s 
“local experiments” language refers both to the broader concept 
of decentralized laboratories of federalism similar to the 
district-by-district case management plans mandated by the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 
5089 (1990), and to actual random experiments testing the 
effectiveness of new or proposed rules amendments. A court 
can require participants in a policy experiment to answer what 
would otherwise be voluntary questions about the experiment. 
To ensure accurate coding, a court should stress to experiment 
participants that both the adversarial process and Rule 11 
apply to their case. 
Rule 1.1 should not be interpreted as authorizing random 
experimental testing of the rules. Only Congress should 
authorize such random experimental testing through federal 
legislation. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Experimentation in the Law: 
Report of the Federal Judicial Center Advisory Committee on 
Experimentation in the Law (1981); Carl Tobias, A Modest 
Reform for Federal Procedural Rulemaking: Complex Litigation 
at the Millennium, 64 L. & Contemp. Probs. 283, 287 (2001); 
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial 
Conference of the U.S., Proposed Rules: Preliminary Draft of 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
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and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991) 
(proposing a never-adopted revision to Rule 83(b), “[w]ith the 
approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States, a 
district court may adopt an experimental local rule inconsistent 
with these rules if it is consistent with the provisions of Title 
28 of the United States Code and is limited in its period of 
effectiveness to five years or less.”). 
Rule 1.1(b)(1)(C) expands upon Rule 5(d)(3)’s language that 
a “paper filed electronically is a written paper for purposes of 
these rules” to make clear that electronic filers are to treat 
mandatory coding with the same level of professionalism, 
diligence, and candor as any other signed representation to the 
court. 
Finally, in the unlikely event that a court inadvertently 
discloses nonpublic information collected through voluntary 
coding, Rule 1.1(2)(C) provides the affected party with the same 
privilege protections in any subsequent lawsuit as if that party 
had mistakenly disclosed the information during discovery. 
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3. Cost Challenges386 
 
Most progress, particularly technological progress, costs 
money. The technological enhancements to the next generation 
of CM/ECF recommended in this Article387 are no exception. 
They probably would be quite expensive, particularly if they 
are done right the first time. With its careful long-term 
planning,388 the AOUSC appears to grasp the benefits of 
designing the next generation of CM/ECF comprehensively up 
front because “[j]udges and Judiciary staff now regard 
information technology not as something separate from their 
day-to-day work, but simply as the means by which they do 
their jobs.”389 But is the cost worth it? The predictable but 
appropriate response is yes. The increased technological 
capabilities—to include providing an objective descriptive 
factual baseline for EBP390—are worth the money. 
Fortunately, Congress had the foresight in 1990 to 
establish a special fund, the Judicial Information Technology 
Fund (the “JITF”),391 “for the procurement . . . of information 
technology resources for [judicial] program activities.”392 The 
money in the JITF automatically rolls over from year to year 
and cannot be used for other purposes without the AOUSC’s 
approval.393 From Fiscal Year 2012 to Fiscal Year 2016, the 
AOUSC has forecast its JITF expenditures to average $3.7 
million per year for “Court Administration and Case 
Management,”394 which “encompasses systems that manage 
 
386. Concluding the draft Advisory Committee Note, this Article now 
returns to identifying authorities in footnotes. 
387. See supra Part III.A. 
388. See id. 
389. AOUSC, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra 
note 265, at 1. 
390. See supra Part I.B. 
391. 28 U.S.C. § 612 (a) (2006). 
392. Id.; see also Daniel Holt, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FED. JUDICIAL HISTORY 
OFFICE, FEDERAL JUDICIARY APPROPRIATIONS: 1792–2010, at xii-xiii (2012), 
available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Appropriations.pdf/$file/Appropriatio
ns.pdf. 
393. Holt, supra note 392, at xiii. 
394. See AOUSC, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 
supra note 265, at 10. 
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cases and case files” like CM/ECF,395 $4.56 million per year for 
“Judicial Statistics and Reporting,”396 which “includes the 
collection and reporting of statistical data in the Judiciary,”397 
and $134.86 million per year for the “Electronic Public Access 
Program,”398 which manages PACER.399 
The AOUSC has managed the JITF well, maintaining a 
significant budget surplus. In 2007, the JITF carried a $146.6 
million surplus, $32.2 million400 of which was public user fees 
paid to PACER.401 In 2006, PACER user fees were estimated to 
be about $60 million annually.402 PACER has “become what 
appears to be a profit center that cross-subsidizes other IT 
functions of the Judiciary.”403 In fact, the AOUSC apparently 
plans to use PACER fees to fund the next generation of 
CM/ECF.404 
While there is some debate over whether charging PACER 
fees “that are higher than the marginal cost of disseminating 
the information”405 violates the E-Government Act of 2002,406 
using public PACER fees to pay for the next generation of 
CM/ECF is a clever and practical arrangement so long as it 
does not compromise CM/ECF’s integrity or capabilities. 
 
 
 
395. Id. at 10-11. 
396. See id. at 10. 
397. Id. at 12. 
398. See id. at 10. 
399. Id. at 12. 
400. Stephen Schultze, Electronic Public Access Fees and the United 
States Federal Courts’ Budget: An Overview 4 (2009) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at 
Harvard University) (page number assigned as document is not otherwise 
paginated), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/~sjschultze/Schultze_PACER_Budget_Working_
Paper.pdf. 
401. For further discussion of PACER, see supra notes 269-74 and 
accompanying text. 
402. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 488 & n.17. 
403. Schultze, supra note 400, at 5. 
404. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 116 (2003)). 
405. S. REP. NO. 107-174, at 23 (2002). 
406. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3606 (2006); see Schultze, supra note 400, at 8-
10. 
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CM/ECF’s system design should be focused solely on what 
works best and not on mercenary considerations such as the 
“willingness of the commercial sector to pay PACER fees.”407 
Neither should the AOUSC “grant, deny, or condition” PACER 
fee exemptions “in ways that encourage researchers to portray 
the [federal] courts in a positive light.”408 Such self-interested 
decision making could compromise public perceptions of the 
AOUSC’s impartiality. 
 
4. Privacy Challenges 
 
Even before the internet, court records have long been a 
battleground between government transparency and individual 
privacy.409 The internet and electronic court records have only 
exacerbated this battle. Paradoxically, the ease of public access 
to online electronic court records is, at the same time, the 
dream of open government advocates and the nightmare of 
privacy protectionists.410 
While allied with transparency true believers, EBP views 
online electronic transparency as more of a means than an end. 
Likewise, EBP pragmatically opposes privacy protections 
because eliminating access to individual data would reduce 
contemporaneous coding’s research utility.411 From a research 
perspective, one of the most appealing aspects of 
contemporaneous coding is the direct association of the coding 
to the underlying documents.412 Such direct association not 
only is essential to confirm the statistical reliability and 
validity of coding413 but also allows qualitative or mixed-
method researchers to search the coding to find specific cases 
or documents that meet their research criteria. 
 
407. Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records—From Documents 
to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 870 (2008). 
408. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 515. 
409. See, e.g., Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open 
Justice in the Transition to Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary 
Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 774 (2012). 
410. See LoPucki, supra note 16, at 485. 
411. See id. at 489-90. 
412. See supra Part III.A. 
413. See supra Part III.C. 
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As far as the federal courts are concerned, however, the 
battle has been long over. The current—and predominant414—
federal “public is public” policy415 should remain. As the 
Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and 
Case Management concluded, “[f]ederal court case files, unless 
sealed or otherwise subject to restricted access by statute, 
federal rule, or Judicial Conference policy, are presumed to be 
available for public inspection and copying.”416 “[D]ocuments in 
case files generally should be made available electronically to 
the same extent they are available at the courthouse, provided 
that certain ‘personal data identifiers’ are not included in the 
public file.”417 “Unless the court orders otherwise,” Rule 5.2 
requires parties to redact from a filing: (1) social security and 
tax identification numbers; (2) people’s birth dates; (3) minor’s 
initials; or (4) a financial account number.418 
As Rule 5.2 demonstrates, the federal courts have already 
heard—and rejected—the privacy pleas to further limit access 
to this otherwise public information.419 Because Rule 5.2 gives 
 
414. See LoPucki, supra note 16, at 517 (stating that the predominant 
view is that the “court files should be on-line to the same extent that they are 
available at the courthouse”). 
415. Comm. on Court Admin. & Case Mgmt., Report of the Judicial 
Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management on 
Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., 
(Sept. 2001, as amended Dec. 2006), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/JudiciaryPrivacyPolicy/FormerJud
icialConferencePrivacyPolicy2006.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2012) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
416. Id. (citing Nixon v. Warner Comm., Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)). 
417. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2 advisory committee’s note (2007). 
418. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a). 
419. There are four possible privacy objections to contemporaneous 
coding: (1) the aggregation of publicly available personal information in court 
filings can be embarrassing or lead to identity theft; (2) making this 
“practically obscure” yet public information easy to find is an invasion of 
privacy; (3) it would put unnecessary pressure on judges; and (4) it would 
make it easy to plagiarize lawyer’s work product. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 
514; see also supra note 407. For the persuasive refutation of all of these 
privacy arguments, see LoPucki, supra note 16, at 514-521. 
All these arguments ask the wrong question. The real question is whether 
any of this information should be public in the first place. The uncontested 
answer is that all of this information is already public in individual cases. It 
is nonsensical to limit what is already public information in individual 
instances just because it is available in aggregate form online. Such 
reasoning essentially favors wealthier institutional parties. See LoPucki, 
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a court considerable discretion to redact or seal personal 
information in public court filings, the answer to all of these 
privacy objections is simply vigilant party counsel. 
The Rule appropriately puts the onus of redacting or 
sealing personal information “with counsel and the party or 
non-party making the filing.”420 A filer or party thus may ask 
the court to redact additional information from a filing for 
“good cause”421 or to place a filing under seal without 
redaction.422 The court may later order that the sealed filing 
either be unsealed or that “a redacted version” be filed “for the 
public record.”423 
 
B. Coding Questions 
 
Multi-user databases like the FCCEDD aspire for a 
“combinatoric advantage” where researchers working together 
on a shared database can create more useful information than 
if they were working independently.424 Such databases seek to 
be “so rich in content that multiple users, even those with 
distinct projects, can draw on them.”425 
As a result, the FCCEDD needs to provide data useful to 
all kinds of empirical research. Experimental,426 
quantitative,427 qualitative,428 and mixed-method429 empirical 
research are all invaluable to evaluate EBP in general and 
 
supra note 16, at 514-15. For example, assume that while individual data 
remained publicly available, CM/ECF restricted public access to aggregated 
data. What if an aftermarket third-party obtained the public individual data, 
aggregated it into a proprietary database, and then charged expensive fees to 
access the database? As a result, only the rich “Haves” would be able to 
benefit from the aggregated public information. Under the current “public is 
public” federal rule, the less wealthy “Have Nots” would also be able to 
benefit from aggregated public information. 
420. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2 advisory committee’s note (2007). 
421. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(e). 
422. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(d). 
423. Id. 
424. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 21-23. 
425. Id. at 21. 
426. BORUCH, supra note 30. 
427. BRYMAN, supra note 23, at 19-20. 
428. Id. 
429. Nielsen, supra note 243, at 953. 
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federal civil rulemaking in particular. Each method is a useful 
EBP tool with complementary strengths and limitations. 
A controlled policy experiment may make the most 
analytical sense for EBP but is fraught with political peril. 
“Without doubt, the most powerful and reliable way to 
investigate the impact of a legal rule [or] procedure . . . is to 
conduct a controlled experiment” because it can best “isolate 
the impact” of the new rule or rule amendment “by excluding 
all other factors that may account for the observed effects or 
relationships.”430 One of the advantages of experiments is that 
they are easy for non-experts to understand and hard to 
ignore.431 The experiment’s weaknesses, however, are the 
possible constitutional and ethical objections to government 
policies that benefit or burden its citizens through random 
chance.432 Recognizing the potential political difficulties of a 
controlled policy experiment, its considerable research 
effectiveness notwithstanding, this Article recommends that 
Congress pass authorizing legislation before the federal courts 
can employ controlled experiments to evaluate new or proposed 
rules amendments.433 
While quantitative methods dominate EBP, are 
epistemologically the most scientifically rigorous, and provide 
the most direct way to analyze large multi-user datasets like 
the FCCEDD,434 qualitative methods can better answer the 
question of why one proposed amendment may be preferable 
over another in light of current political and factual realities.435 
Qualitative methods “can help to formulate and focus the key 
evaluation questions, shed light on the underlying theories 
supporting intervention design, and highlight the outcomes to 
be examined.”436 Although the FCCEDD is at its core a 
 
430. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 14. 
431. See Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 919. 
432. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 14-15. For an explanation of how these 
constitutional and ethical objections might be resolved, see Rachlinski, supra 
note 18. 
433. For further discussion, see supra notes 108-10, and accompanying 
text. 
434. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice 
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 10. 
435. Id. 
436. Id. 
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quantitative dataset, its ability to hyperlink to the underlying 
filed documents associated with particular coding is a unique 
feature that can help qualitative and mixed-method 
researchers identify particular cases or documents for 
qualitative analysis.437 
The key is to use the right tool for the right task and, most 
importantly, to coordinate all the tools in the EBP toolkit 
effectively. The baseline descriptive data in the FCCEDD work 
with all empirical methods. Regardless of method, the 
FCCEDD can provide the necessary descriptive feedback to 
evaluate whether rules amendments are achieving “the 
intended results without unacceptable side effects.”438 
Moreover, by providing a rich, shared data source to be 
used by quantitative and qualitative researchers alike, the 
FCCEDD can promote greater collaboration and understanding 
between different empirical methodologies. Identical FCCEDD 
data can be analyzed through different methodological lenses. 
A comparison of the similarities and differences between the 
resulting studies can help inform the strengths and limitations 
of each form of inquiry.439 
To provide data useful to all empirical methods, however, 
requires flexible yet comprehensive coding questions. Perhaps 
the FCCEDD’s most difficult challenge is selecting the 
appropriate coding questions to gather such data. Perfecting 
the FCCEDD’s coding questions would be a massive 
undertaking requiring thoughtful analysis and careful testing 
and evaluation. Although a detailed discussion of drafting, 
testing, and revising such coding questions is beyond the scope 
of this Article, four general principles should guide the effort: 
(1) involve all stakeholders in creating the coding questions; (2) 
continuously evaluate the coding questions’ effectiveness; (3) 
safeguard the objectivity of coding through total transparency 
and thoughtful, timely responsiveness to constructive criticism; 
and (4) start with best practices, and don’t reinvent the wheel. 
 
 
437. See supra notes 10-11, 286-88, 334-36 and accompanying text. 
438. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 14. 
439. INTERUNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, supra note 
258, at 4. 
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First, although the AOUSC should ultimately administer 
the FCCEDD, all stakeholders to include the practicing Bar, 
the academy, the Advisory Committee, and the FJC must be 
involved in the coding process to maintain the FCCEDD’s 
objectivity. While the AOUSC has a statutory mandate “to 
prepare and transmit . . . statistical data and reports as to the 
business of the courts,”440 the AOUSC is not independent from 
the judiciary.441 In the past, researchers examining AOUSC-
supplied empirical court data have turned up “startling levels 
of inaccuracy.”442 In light of the AOUSC’s less-than-stellar past 
track record443 and the separation-of-powers concerns that the 
AOUSC might influence the data coding process to be biased in 
favor of the federal judiciary,444 all other professional 
stakeholders in the federal court must be actively involved in 
the entire coding process. Perhaps the AOUSC can continue to 
use the ASFRG445 or commission a similar group to aid with 
the coding process. 
Second, the AOUSC and other institutional stakeholders 
should continuously evaluate the coding questions’ 
effectiveness. Before rolling out the coding questions 
nationally, the Advisory Committee, the FJC, the AOUSC, and 
the ASFRG (or similar stakeholder group) should carefully test 
and assess the proposed questions in pilot federal districts and 
circuits. This process of course should be transparent with the 
resulting data available to the public. 
 
 
 
440. 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2) (2006). 
441. For further discussion, see supra notes 185-90 and accompanying 
text. 
442. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 519. 
443. Id. at 519 n.130 (collecting authorities); see also Alexander A. 
Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 140 (2011); 
Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil 
Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in 
the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1310-11 (2005); 
Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1455 (2003). 
444. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 515 & n.117. 
445. For further discussion, see supra notes 299-302 and accompanying 
text. 
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Third, the only way the FCCEDD can provide an objective 
descriptive baseline for policy debates is if it is maintained 
with total transparency. The “process by which the data came 
to be observed” must be recorded in detail.446 The FCCEDD’s 
so-called “‘chain of evidence’”447 must be “fully documented and 
unbroken.”448 Furthermore, the institutional stewards of this 
data must respond to any legitimate criticisms thoughtfully 
and timely and, most importantly, adopt necessary changes to 
maintain the FCCEDD’s continuing credibility. 
The best institutional steward of the FCCEDD and related 
EBP research would be a dedicated independent research 
organization.449 Such a federal dispute resolution research 
agency could be called the National Academy of Justice (the 
“NAJ”)450 and could be a federal justice addition to the National 
Academies (the “NA”).451 Just as federal judges adjudicate 
cases while the AOUSC keeps the lights on in judges’ 
chambers, the NAJ could handle substantive decisions about 
the FCCEDD, while the AOUSC could handle the 
administrative details. Moreover, the NAJ could serve as an 
impartial monitor of policy experiments and report the results 
to the Advisory Committee.452 The NAJ’s mission would be to 
seek fundamental knowledge about the American federal 
dispute resolution system and the application of that 
knowledge to further the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
resolution of disputes. It either could be restricted to the 
federal civil system or could include the federal criminal 
system. 
 
 
446. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 24. 
447. A “chain of evidence” establishes that no unauthorized people have 
had access to critical evidence. See DEBORAH MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, 
LEARNING EVIDENCE 124 (2d ed. 2012). 
448. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 24. 
449. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
450. Accord Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 687. 
451. The National Academies (“NA”) include the National Academy of 
Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and 
National Research Council. About Us, THE NAT’L ACADS., 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/index.html (last visited Dec. 27, 
2012) [hereinafter THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES]. 
452. See Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 910. 
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The primary difference between the NAJ and other related 
organizations such as the National Institute of Justice (the 
“NIJ”) and the FJC is in organizational affiliation. Like the 
NA,453 the NAJ would have institutional independence from all 
government branches and enforce the highest standards of 
research quality and merit review. In contrast, the NIJ and 
FJC are affiliated respectively with the executive branch454 and 
the judicial branch.455 
Finally, the AOUSC and other institutional stakeholders 
should not re-invent the wheel when gathering, archiving, and 
coding the FCCEDD. Federal, state, and local governments456 
and public and private organizations457 in the United States 
and around the world continue to make constant innovations in 
e-Government technology and infrastructure. The AOUSC 
should comprehensively study such innovations (as they 
undoubtedly already are). There also are well-established best 
practices for authenticating, archiving, and coding multi-user 
datasets. For example, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has drafted a Uniform 
Electronic Legal Material Act that provides “an outcomes-
based approach to the authentication and preservation of 
electronic legal material.”458 Both the Dutch Data Archiving 
 
453. See THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 451. 
454. A NA report on the NIJ concluded that the NIJ’s research has been 
“severely hampered” by a lack of “independence” and “authority.” NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 2 
(Charles Wellford et al., eds. 2010). 
455. While the FJC is institutionally independent from the AOUSC, the 
FJC remains the Advisory Committee’s primary researcher. See supra Part 
III.B.2. 
456. See generally GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF 
THE INTERNET § 17.06 (2013). 
457. One of the worldwide leaders in open government information is the 
Legal Information Institute (“LII”) at Cornell University Law School. See 
About LII, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/lii/about-lii (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
458. The Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Electronic 
Legal Material Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic Legal 
Material Act (last visited Jan. 26, 2013); see UNIF. LEGAL MATERIAL ACT 
(2011), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/AM2011_Prestyle%20Finals/UELM
A_PreStyleFinal_Jul11.pdf. 
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and Networked Services (“DANS”) and the Swiss International 
Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) Standard Reference 
Model for an Open Archival Information System (“OAIS”) have 
specific guidelines for data-archiving and sharing.459 The 
FCCEDD should meet or exceed the DANS quality guidelines 
and the OAIS standards.460 Likewise, the FJC should 
comprehensively review the coding schemes employed by the 
many available civil justice datasets461 and civil justice 
empirical studies462 before the Advisory Committee drafts the 
FCCEDD’s coding questions. When drafting these coding 
questions, the FCCEDD should follow the ICPSR’s variable 
codebook guidelines.463 
Table 1 below lists some sample mandatory and voluntary 
coding outcomes for a complaint or an answer.464 For simplicity, 
Table 1 assumes one individual plaintiff and one individual 
defendant with a civil lawsuit in federal district court. To 
obtain the outcomes listed in Table 1, CM/ECF might need to 
ask a number of follow-up questions with drop down menus465 
or dialog boxes.466 Those questions are omitted from Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Sample Complaint and Answer Mandatory and 
Voluntary Coding Outcomes 
Pleading Mandatory Outcomes Voluntary Outcomes 
Complaint Name of district court 
where filed. 
Date and time filed. 
Case number. 
Case caption. 
Plaintiff’s gender. 
Plaintiff’s age. 
Plaintiff’s educational 
level.468 
Lawyer’s age. 
 
459. INTERUNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, supra 
note 258, at 4-5. 
460. Id. 
461. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 16, at 493 (describing datasets). 
462. See, e.g., ELS Bibliography, UCLA L., https://apps.law.ucla.edu/els/ 
(last visited Dec. 27, 2012). 
463. INTERUNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, supra note 
258, at 22-23. 
464. FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a). 
465. See supra note 8. 
466. See supra note 9. 
468. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 489 (explaining how these outcomes 
“would add to the power of the data”). 
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Pleading Mandatory Outcomes Voluntary Outcomes 
Party names and 
addresses. 
For each claim: 
Specific legal grounds 
for subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
Specific legal grounds 
for personal 
jurisdiction. 
Specific legal grounds 
for venue. 
Specific federal or state 
constitutional, 
statutory, or common 
law authority. 
Specific judgment 
demanded and relief 
sought to include type 
and amount of 
damages or equitable 
relief. 
Does the claim make a 
“nonfrivolous argument 
for extending, 
modifying, or reversing 
existing law or for 
establishing new 
law?”467 
Is there a request for a 
jury trial? 
Total number of words 
and paragraphs for: 
Factual allegations. 
Legal or mixed 
factual/legal 
allegations. 
Total number of pages 
Lawyer’s educational 
information. 
Lawyer’s past 
professional experience 
in relevant specific 
areas of law. 
Lawyer’s fee 
arrangement. 
Fee billed on preparing 
the complaint. 
Number of hours spent 
on legal research. 
Number of hours spent 
drafting complaint. 
Number of hours spent 
on fact investigation. 
Basic diagnostic 
knowledge questions 
about relevant areas of 
law (e.g., knowledge of 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009); Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007)). 
Would you be willing to 
be interviewed 
confidentially by a 
researcher about your 
complaint? 
 
 
467. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
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Pleading Mandatory Outcomes Voluntary Outcomes 
in complaint. 
Specify allegations made 
upon “information or 
belief.” 
If there are any exhibits: 
Total number of 
exhibits. 
Name and general 
purpose of each exhibit. 
Civil cover sheet 
completed? 
Summons completed? 
Certificate and Notice of 
Interested Parties? If 
yes, specify what 
parties. 
In Forma Pauperis 
Application filed? If yes, 
accepted or denied? On 
what grounds? 
Answer Date and time filed. 
For each cross-
referenced paragraph in 
the complaint: 
Which part do you 
admit? Basis for 
admission. 
Which part do you 
deny? Basis for denial. 
Which part(s) do you 
lack sufficient 
information to answer 
and deem denied? 
For each affirmative 
defense in the answer: 
Specific federal or state 
constitutional, 
statutory, or common 
law authority. 
Defendant’s gender. 
Defendant’s age. 
Defendant’s educational 
level. 
Lawyer’s educational 
information. 
Lawyer’s past 
professional experience. 
Lawyer’s past 
professional experience 
in relevant specific 
areas of law. 
Lawyer’s fee 
arrangement. 
Fee billed on preparing 
the answer. 
Number of hours spent 
on legal research. 
Number of hours spent 
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Pleading Mandatory Outcomes Voluntary Outcomes 
In response to what 
claim in the complaint. 
Total number of words 
and paragraphs 
(omitting text copied 
from the complaint) for: 
Answering factual 
allegations. 
Answering legal or 
mixed factual/legal 
allegations. 
Total number of pages 
in the answer. 
Specify allegations made 
upon “information or 
belief.” 
If there are any exhibits: 
Total number of 
exhibits. 
Name and general 
purpose of each exhibit. 
 
drafting the answer. 
Number of hours spent 
on fact investigation. 
Basic diagnostic 
knowledge questions 
about relevant areas of 
law. 
(e.g., knowledge of 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662; 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
544). 
Did you talk to opposing 
counsel before filing 
your answer? If yes, for 
how long and about 
what? 
Where there settlement 
negotiations before you 
filed the answer? If yes, 
what kind of 
negotiations, for what 
kind of relief, and to 
what result? 
Would you be willing to 
be interviewed 
confidentially by a 
researcher about your 
answer? 
 
Conclusion 
 
Federal civil rulemaking offers much promise for EBP. It 
utilizes an expert committee structure insulated from, yet 
accountable to, popular democracy.469 The Advisory Committee 
appears sincerely interested in EBP470 and takes its time—
typically, three to five years—to evaluate proposed rules 
 
469. For further discussion, see supra Part II.B.1. 
470. For further discussion, see id. 
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amendments.471 In addition, the Committee has an 
independent, professional researcher, the FJC, to conduct any 
empirical research the Committee needs.472 Moreover, the 
increasing popularity of empiricism in the Academy facilitates 
additional research.473 Such academic research also provides a 
useful check on the FJC.474 
But the expensive federal adversarial litigation system 
also offers peril for EBP. EBP cannot avoid normative 
concerns. Empirical research still must be interpreted through 
a normative lens.475 The scope and limits of empirical research 
are dictated by normative theory.476 And the adversarial 
process provides often diametrically different normative lenses 
through which to interpret empirical research.477 
Take Rule 1, which states that the rules “should be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action.”478 Just by what 
standard? Determining the applicable standard of justice is a 
normative concern. Different players in the litigation might 
have different standards of justice. Justice might mean one 
thing in a small, simple lawsuit and another in a complex class 
action.479 Speedy according to whom? The plaintiff and the 
defendant will have different normative conceptions of process 
efficiency.480 Inexpensive according to whom? Do we factor in 
larger societal or economic costs in the expense calculus or 
 
471. See Kravitz, supra note 45, at 216-17. 
472. For further discussion, see supra Part II.B.2. 
473. For further discussion, see supra Part II.C. 
474. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice 
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 8. 
475. See AYRES, supra note 34, at 124-128; LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, 
at 21. For further discussion, see supra Part I.A. 
476. A “legal theory” is “a set of general propositions used as an 
explanation” of law that are “sufficiently abstract to be relevant to more than 
just particularized situations.” Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: 
The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1601 
n.3 (1991). A normative theory is a legal theory about norms. For a definition 
of “norms,” see supra note 56. 
477. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text. 
478. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
479. See Dimitrief et al., supra note 44, at 214. 
480. See id. at 214-15. 
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limit ourselves to the real costs of the actual parties?481 
Although empirical research can and should inform 
normative debates, it can never resolve them.482 Instead of 
opposing empirical research, policymakers who insofar have 
relied more on ideology, intuition, or experience should 
recognize empirical research’s value-added contribution.483 The 
best policy will employ all available tools. All policymakers 
thus need at least to be familiar enough with empirical 
methods to distinguish quality from shoddy research.484 
Empirical research—particularly the objective descriptive data 
for which this Article advocates—provides the best diagnostic 
starting point for formulating new policy and the best 
accountability for evaluating the effectiveness of implemented 
or experimental policy. But empirical research alone cannot 
answer normative questions. 
In the civil litigation context, perhaps the greatest 
normative question facing the federal courts today is how to 
control access to the courts.485 Do we have too much litigation486 
or is there a continuing need for private attorneys general to 
enforce our existing laws?487 The current “restrictive ethos”488 
in federal civil litigation conflicts with the “liberal ethos” 
behind the original rules.489 
In the past, fear, hysteria, and anecdote have dominated 
this debate. Although normative ideology in such debates is 
unavoidable, verifiable empirical assertions are cavalierly 
tossed around without any accountability. EBP requires 
policymakers to ante up the evidence behind such empirical 
assertions. Policy debates that rely upon false factual 
assertions are a disservice to the democratic process. As 
 
481. Id. at 217. 
482. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 21. 
483. See, e.g., AYRES, supra note 34, at 11, 17. 
484. For further discussion, see supra Part I.C. 
485. See Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 
1906 (1989). 
486. See id. at 1907-09. 
487. Id. 
488. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 358-66 (2010). 
489. Id. at 353-57. 
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Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan recognized: “Everyone is 
entitled to his own opinions, but not to his own facts.”490 
A cautionary tale of the misleading power of anecdote is 
the myth of the excessiveness of the jury verdict in the 
infamous McDonald’s coffee burn lawsuit, Liebeck v. 
McDonald’s Restaurants.491 A dispassionate examination of the 
actual facts of the case shows that the verdict was reasonably 
based upon the considerable evidence of McDonald’s reckless 
indifference.492 Despite the reasonableness of the final result, 
media organizations neglected to do their homework and 
instead uncritically accepted the tort-reform spin on the case. 
For example, the influential Associated Press newswire service 
dispensed with any pretense of objectivity and trumpeted the 
verdict as an “absurd judgment” and “a stunning illustration of 
what is wrong with America’s civil justice system.”493 
As Judge Jack Weinstein has observed: “The truth about 
the ‘litigation explosion’ is that it is a weapon of perception, not 
substance. If the public can be persuaded that there is a 
litigation crisis, it may support efforts to cut back on litigation 
access.”494 Shoddy empirical research can be used to fuel 
ideological arguments. For example, Ted Eisenberg’s work has 
exposed the methodological flaws in a Chamber of Commerce 
commissioned civil litigation empirical study.495 
This Article does not attempt to take sides in this access to 
justice debate. Arguments for increased access often are based 
upon ideology as much as arguments for a so-called “litigation 
explosion.”496 The questionable merit of some empirical studies 
 
490. Clive Crook, The Unhealthy Politics of Health Care, BLOOMBERG 
(June 26, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-06-26/health-
care-debate-shows-deeper-political-sickness.html. 
491. See Michael McCann et al., Java Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical 
Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113, 121 & n.28 (2001) (citing Liebeck v. 
McDonald’s Rest., P.T.S., Inc., No. 93 Cv. 02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. 
Ct. 1994)). 
492. Id. at 128. 
493. Id. at 113 (quoting Associated Press, Woman Burned by Hot 
McDonald’s Coffee Gets $2.9 Million, Aug. 18, 1994). 
494. Weinstein, supra note 485, at 1909. 
495. See Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability 
Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
969, 969-70 (2009). 
496. Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 690-91 (collecting 
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advocating fewer lawsuits does not diminish the legitimate 
ideological reasons for a less litigious society.497 But while anti-
litigation advocates are entitled to their own opinions, they are 
not entitled to their own facts. 
The modest point of this Article is to establish baseline 
objective data like the FCCEDD with which to evaluate the 
unavoidable normative choices our democracy makes.498 As 
Bogenschneider and Corbett astutely noted, “stimulat[ing] a 
dialogue between those who spend most of their time producing 
knowledge (researchers, evaluators, and analysts), those who 
focus on the utilization of knowledge (legislators, agency 
executives, and program managers), and all those 
intermediaries who assist these officials” is a “modest” way “to 
improve the quality of government by bringing more rationality 
to the governance process.”499 A shared source of relevant, 
representative, and reliable500 descriptive data like the 
FCCEDD can promote such dialogue. An enlightened 
dictatorship that forced everyone to act only in ways supported 
by empirical evidence would best implement EBP. But we do 
not have a dictatorship and presumably do not want one. 
As the ancient Greeks recognized, one of the costs of 
democracy is the risk of the public being swayed by popular 
hysteria or emotion.501 Law unavoidably has conflicting goals. 
In the civil litigation context, as Rule 1 fails to recognize, 
“justice” for the individual often conflicts with “speed” and 
“inexpense” in litigation.502 As Marc Galanter observed: “Civil 
justice issues involve value choices—and that means political 
choices. But an enhanced knowledge base can rescue us from a 
debate dominated by bogus questions and fictional facts.”503 
 
authorities). 
497. See, e.g., PHILLIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW 
LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1995). 
498. For further discussion, see supra Part I.B. 
499. BOGENSCHNEIDER & CORBETT, supra note 18, at xii. 
500. Solesbury, supra note 18, at 8-9. 
501. See, e.g., Polybius, Histories, Book III, in 2 POLYBIUS: THE 
HISTORIES (Loeb Classical Library ed. 1922-1927), available at 
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/3*.html (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2012). 
502. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
503. Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil 
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Menkel-Meadow and Garth recognized that the best empirical 
research can, at most, only inform these value choices: 
 
There is very little that social science research 
and data can do to help resolve the fundamental 
questions about what purpose(s) courts serve and 
for whom (dispute resolution for the parties or 
public law generation for the larger society?). At 
best, social science research can help us to 
understand if particular rules are more or less 
likely to let in particular claims or particular 
claimants or whether particular procedural 
systems disproportionately serve particular 
kinds of cases or litigants.504 
 
Perhaps as a democracy we have decided in civil litigation 
disproportionately to serve the “Haves.”505 That is a political 
choice. If true, then let us gather accurate empirical data about 
the consequences of that political choice so that the American 
public and its policymakers can choose with their eyes wide 
open. Such public, institutionalized empirical accountability of 
democratic decision making may be the ultimate realization of 
the legal realist project.506 Empirical research “just strips away 
all the roadblocks that you might have or at least it makes 
them bare. If the people are going to make a . . . decision” based 
on politics contrary to the research findings, “then they are 
going to make it despite the facts.”507 
The unique circumstances of federal civil rulemaking and 
the CM/ECF system provide an unparalleled opportunity for 
EBP. This Article hopes that the Advisory Committee will 
seriously consider adopting the Model Rule508 and 
 
Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 102 (1993). 
504. Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 699-700. 
505. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974), available at 
http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/~phelps/Galanter%201974.pdf. 
506. For further discussion about legal realism and new legal realism, 
see supra Part II.C. 
507. AYRES, supra note 34, at 79-80 (quoting economist Paul Gertler 
about randomized trial evaluation). 
508. For further discussion, see supra Part IV.A. 
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implementing the contemporaneous coding of CM/ECF cases to 
create the FCCEDD.509 Mandating such coding would provide 
not only an invaluable, publicly accessible empirical baseline 
with which to assess federal civil rulemaking, but also an 
excellent example of how EBP can inform the difficult policy 
choices in democratic government. 
Following the federal courts’ lead, all branches of 
democratic government at local, state, and national levels could 
mandate that policymakers during the policymaking process 
must contemporaneously code outcomes into a publicly 
available, searchable electronic database. While perhaps not as 
formally as in litigation, all lawmaking relies to some extent on 
the adversarial process and a professional duty of candor. 
Legislation or regulations could formally assign fact-checking 
duties to institutional players in the policymaking process or to 
independent civil servants to safeguard the objectivity of these 
databases. 
Publicly available electronic descriptive databases of 
policymaking outcomes are a simple way to leverage technology 
to provide comprehensive, reliable, and inexpensive evidence 
for EBP. Easy access to these objective empirical baselines 
would encourage both policymakers and the public to focus 
more on facts and less on politics. 
 
509. For further discussion, see supra Part IV.B. 
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